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Policy, Institutional Factors and Earnings Mobility 
 
This paper uses ECHP and OECD data for 14 EU countries to explore the role of labour 
market factors in explaining cross-national differences in the dynamic structure of earnings: in 
permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility. Based on ECHP, minimum 
distance estimator is used to decompose earnings inequality into the permanent and 
transitory components and compute earnings mobility. The predicted components together 
with the institutional OECD data are used in a non-linear least squares setting to estimate the 
relationship between permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility, and 
labour market policy and institutional factors. The results revealed a highly complex 
framework, where institutions interact significantly not only with each other and with the 
overall institutional setting, but also with the macroeconomic shocks in shaping the pattern of 
the three labour market outcomes. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s triggered a strong debate with respect to the driving factors behind individual earnings 
dynamics and the implications of this increase. The empirical literature has covered extensively 
the  driving  factors  behind  the  increase  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequality.  Factors  like 
economic growth (“Kuznetz hypothesis”); “the shift in demand away from unskilled labour in 
favour of skilled workers” (Atkinson 1996) under the impact of trade liberalization, skill-biased 
technological  change  and  organizational  change;  the  role  of  changes  in  the  labour  market 
institutions,  such  as  unionization  and  centralized  bargaining,  macroeconomic  volatility,  are 
among the main possible drivers of income inequality as identified by the empirical literature. 
(Freeman and Katz 1994; Freeman and Gibbons 1995; Fortin and Lemieux 1997; Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997; Katz and Autor 1999; Aghion and Williamson 2001) 
Notwithstanding this, the empirical literature has neglected so far the driving factors behind the 
two components of earnings inequality: permanent and transitory inequality. Even less attention 
was given to the driving factors behind earnings mobility, which, as stated by Milton Friedman 
(1962), represents a very important aspect for understanding inequality. All these labour market 
outcomes  are  highly  important  given  that  the  interplay  between  them  determines  the  final 
earnings inequality outcome, both in an annual and lifetime perspective. 
In this line of thought, this paper explores the role of labour market policy and institutional 
factors  in  explaining  cross-national  differences  in  the  evolution  of  permanent  inequality, 
transitory inequality and earnings mobility across 14 EU countries. So far, at the EU level, no 2 
 
study attempted to analyse and to understand the driving factors behind the three labour market 
outcomes in a comparative manner. 
Understanding the driving forces behind these labour market outcomes is vitally important from 
a welfare perspective, particularly given the large variation in the evolution of cross-sectional 
wage inequality across Europe over the period 1994-2001. Did the increase in cross-sectional 
wage inequality observed in some countries result from greater transitory fluctuations in earnings 
and individuals facing a higher degree of earnings mobility? Or is this rise reflecting increasing 
permanent differences between individuals with mobility remaining constant or even falling? 
What  about  countries  that  recorded  a  decrease  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequalities,  what 
lessons can we learn from them? What are the possible labour market policy and institutional 
factors  that  can  explain  these  trends  in  permanent  and  transitory  differentials,  and  earnings 
mobility?  
These questions have a twofold importance. One the one hand, understanding the contributions 
of the changes in permanent and transitory components of earnings variation to the changes in 
cross-sectional earnings inequality is very useful in the evaluation of alternative hypotheses for 
wage  structure  changes  and  for  determining  the  potential  welfare  consequences  of  rising 
inequality. (Katz and Autor 1999)  
On  the  other  hand,  understanding  the  driving  factors  behind  the  changes  in  permanent  and 
transitory inequality and earnings mobility is very useful for the design of polices and labour 
market institutions. Earnings mobility is perceived in the literature as a way out of poverty. In the 
absence of mobility the same individuals remain stuck at the bottom of the distribution, hence 
annual earnings differentials are transformed into lifetime earnings differentials. Understanding 
the factors that enhance earnings mobility, represents a step forward towards designing policies 3 
 
and  institutions  that  enable  low-wage  workers  to  escape  low-wage  jobs  and  improve  their 
position in the distribution of lifetime earnings. 
These questions are highly relevant in the context of the changes that took place in the EU labour 
market policy framework under the incidence of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy and the 2000 
Lisbon  Agenda,  which  recommended  policies  to  increase  wage  flexibility,  lower  non-wage 
labour costs and allow relative wages to better reflect individual differences in productivity and 
local  labour  market  conditions.  The  turnaround  in  the  institutional  and  policy  framework 
occurred more or less after 1995. (OECD 2004; Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008). Before 1995, 
Europe could have been described as making labour more expensive, accompanied by a decline 
in employment and an increase in productivity. Starting at different dates for different policies, 
Europe began the process of shifting toward making  labour less  expensive, accompanied  by 
higher  employment  per  capita  but  lower  average  productivity  per  hour.  (Dew-Becker  and 
Gordon 2008) Moreover, all OECD countries moved towards greater decentralization, which 
could result in greater inter-firm wage differentials. These trends appear to have worsened the 
apparent trade-off between a strong employment performance and a more equal distribution of 
earnings, consistent with relative labour demand having shifted towards high-skilled workers. 
OECD (2004) 
As pointed out by Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) and OECD (2004), the most notable change 
after 1995 in Europe has been increased country heterogeneity. We will investigate how the 
heterogeneity in main labour market policy and institutional factors translates itself in the level 
and components of cross-sectional earnings inequality and earnings mobility.  
Using ECHP we apply equally weighted minimum distance methods to estimate the covariance 
structure  of  earnings  by  four  birth  cohorts  for  each  country,  decompose  earnings  into  a 4 
 
permanent  and  a  transitory  component  and  compute  earnings  mobility.  The  predicted 
components – permanent variance, transitory  variance and earnings  mobility -, together with 
OECD  data  on  institutional  factors,  are  used  to  estimate  the  relationship  between  these 
components and  labour  market policy and  institutional  factors. The relationship  between the 
labour market policy and institutional factors and the three labour market outcomes is estimated 
using non-linear least squares.  
The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  two  introduces  the  literature  review,  the 
theoretical  background  for wage differentials  and the theoretical  link  between  labour market 
factors and the three labour market outcomes. Section three provides a description of the ECHP 
and OECD data. Section four introduces the econometric specifications and estimation methods 
for the covariance structure of earnings and for the link between institutional and policy factors 
and  labour  market  outcomes.  Section  five  describes  the  dynamic  structure of  individual  log 
earnings for 14 EU countries and the evolution of the labour market institutions and policies. 
Section  six  fits  the  error  components  models  to  the  covariance  structure  for  each  country, 
decomposing the change in inequality into that accounted for by the change in the permanent and 
transitory  components.  Section  seven  presents  the  results  on  the  link  between  policies  and 
outcomes. Lastly, section eight offers some conclusions. 5 
 
2.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
2.1. Literature Review  
The existing  literature on earnings dynamics  is  predominantly  based on US data. (Atkinson, 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on earnings dynamics 
until 1992. The most representative contributions using US or Canadian data were brought by 
Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), 
Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995; 1998; 2002; 2008), Baker (1997), Baker and Solon (2003). For 
Europe, the most representative papers are Dickens (2000), Ramos (2003), Kalwij and Alessie 
(2003), Cappellari (2003), Gustavson (2004).  
Finally,  Sologon  and  O'Donoghue  (2009)  used  ECHP  for  14  EU  countries  to  explore  the 
dynamic  structure of  individual  earnings  and  the  extent  to  which  changes  in  cross-sectional 
earnings inequality reflect transitory or permanent components of individual lifecycle earnings 
variation. Their main findings will be used further in this paper. 
The main limitation of the existing studies on earnings dynamics is that they do not explain the 
main  labour  market  policy  and  institutional  driving  factors  behind  the  evolution  of  the  two 
inequality component and earnings mobility. Our paper attempts to fill part of this gap. 
2.2. Determinants of earnings inequality  
As pointed out by Katz and Autor (1999), the existing literature contains many explanations for 
the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. The theory regarding the determinants of wage differentials goes back to Adam Smith, 
who provided a comprehensive discussion in his capital work, The Wealth of Nations. It was 
emphasized  that  wage  differentials  are  determined  by  competitive  factors  relating  to  the 6 
 
workplace (e.g. cost of training), by innate abilities and by labour market institutional factors, 
which regulated wages, restricted wages and labour mobility. The tension between the demand 
and  supply  factors  and  the  institutional  factors  affecting  wage  structures  that  emerged  from 
Adam Smith’s analysis has remained until today one of the key themes of research on the wage 
structure.  Following  Freeman  and  Katz  (1994),  this  supply-demand-institutions  (SDI) 
explanation for the changes in the wage structure has three parts.  
The first part assumes that different demographic and skill groups are imperfect substitutes in 
production, which implies that shifts in the demand and supply for labour skills can alter wage 
and employment outcomes. Potential important sources of shifts in the relative demand among 
skill groups include skill-biased technological change and a complementary increase in the prices 
of other inputs, and forces of globalization (trade and outsourcing). Sources of relative supply 
include cohort size variation, changes in access to education, immigration. Supply and demand 
factors are expected to have their largest effect on young workers as opposed to experienced 
workers with substantial work tenure. (Freeman 1976) 
However,  since  most  advanced  countries  operate  in  the  same  world  markets,  with  similar 
technology, industry and occupation mixes, demand and supply factors cannot by themselves 
explain all the differing changes in inequality among these countries. To fully understand the 
differences in labour market outcomes across advanced countries something else is needed: the 
institutional framework.(Freeman and Katz 1994)  
The second part states that the shock in the demand and supply may have different effects on 
wages  and  employment,  depending  on  different  wage-setting  mechanisms  and  other  labour 
market institutional factors. The stronger the wage-setting mechanism is, meaning the higher 
trade union density, the higher the union coverage and the higher the centralisation/co-ordination 7 
 
of wage bargaining, the less impact these shocks have on wages. As argued by OECD (2004), 
there is a strong evidence that unions reduce wage inequality and that this compression effect is 
stronger in countries where union membership and bargaining coverage are high, and bargaining 
is  centralised  and/or  co-ordinated  (Aidt  and  Tzannatos,  2002;  Blau  and  Kahn,  1999,  2002; 
OECD,  1997a).  National  labour  markets  characterized  by  decentralized  wage  bargaining 
experience also a higher skill premia and a higher responsiveness of wages to local conditions, 
therefore a higher wage inequality.  
Thirdly,  institutional  changes,  such  as  changes  in  the  degree  of  unionization,  the  degree  of 
centralization/co-ordination of collective bargaining, or product market regulation can have an 
impact on the wage structures.  
Katz and Autor (1999) used the SDI model to look at cross-country differences in wage structure 
changes. The shift in demand for more skilled workers did not result in a sharp increase in wage 
dispersion for all OECD countries. The differences in the growth of skills supply appear to be an 
important  factor  in  explaining  cross-country  differences.  The  same  holds  for  labour  market 
institutions.  Countries  in  which  unions,  wage  bargaining  structure  play  a  larger  role  in  the 
determination of wages recorded smaller increases in inequality. However, the key issue in the 
interplay between demand, supply and institutions is the erroneous assumption that institutional 
change is exogenous. The reality is that institutions are influenced by labour market forces. As 
argued by Freeman and Gibbons (1995), shifts in supply and demand that raise relative wage 
differentials  are  expected to  reduce the  strength  of  the  centralized  collective  bargaining  and 




2.3.Permanent and transitory components of earnings inequality  
Following the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954), individual earnings are 
composed from a permanent and a transitory component. The permanent component of earnings 
reflects personal characteristics, education, training and other systematic elements. The transitory 
component  captures  both  individual  random  factors  (e.g.  illness  and  accident)  and  random 
changes in the market conditions in a particular period and is expected to average out over time, 
with no influence on permanent earnings. In general terms, these are factors which are random to 
the individual perception. Hence, it is logical to require independence between the permanent 
component  and  the  transitory  component.  (Weizsacker  1993)  Following  the  structure  of 
individual  earnings  and  the  independence  assumption  between  the  two  components,  overall 
inequality at any point in time  is composed  from  inequality  in the permanent component of 
earnings and inequality in the transitory component. 
One  approach  for  explaining  changes  in  wage  differential  is  to  decompose  overall  wage 
inequality  into  the  two  components.  The  evolution  of  the  overall  earnings  inequality  is 
determined by the cumulative changes in the two inequality components. As the factors from the 
SDI  model  influence  overall  inequality,  implicitly  they  influence  its  two  components.  The 
intriguing question that arises is which factors influence which component and to what extent. 
Our focus in this paper is mainly on labour market policy and institutional factors. 
This  section  tries  to  establish  a  theoretical  link  between  the  changes  in  the  two  inequality 
components and earnings mobility, and labour market policy and institutional factors. First we 
introduce alternative specifications for decomposing inequality. Second we introduce the concept 
of earnings mobility and its link with permanent and transitory inequality. Finally we present the 9 
 
theoretical  link  between  institutions  and  the  three  labour  marker  outcomes  –  permanent 
inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility. 
2.3.1.  Alternative model specifications for the permanent and transitory components  
Based on Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009), we summarize several models of earnings dynamics 
that have been dominating the literature on permanent and transitory earnings inequality over the 
past 30 years. For a full review, please refer to Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009). We begin with 
the  simplest  specification,  which  provides  a  very  intuitive  insight  into the  decomposition  of 
earnings into their permanent and transitory components. Based on this specification earnings are 
being decomposed as follows: 
 
2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), 1,..., , 1,..., it i it i it v i Y v iid v iid t T i N µ µ µ σ σ = + = = ∼ ∼   (1) 
where  i µ   represents  the  permanent  time-invariant  individual  specific  component  and  it v  
represents the transitory component, which is independent distributed both over individuals and 
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Because i µ   is  assumed  to  incorporate  the  effect  of  lifetime  persistent  individual  specific 
characteristics  such  as  ability,  the  variance  of  the  permanent  component 
2
µ σ   represents  the 
persistent dispersion of earnings or the inequality in the permanent component of earnings. The 
transitory shocks are captured by the transitory variance 
2
v σ  and are assumed to persist only one 
year.  10 
 
This model facilitates the understanding of the inequality decomposition into its permanent and 
transitory components. The  variance of earnings at a certain point  in time,  as  a  measure of 
earnings dispersion, is composed both from a permanent and a transitory dispersion (
2 2
v µ σ σ + ). 
The covariances, on the other hand, are determined solely by the permanent component (
2
µ σ ). 
Therefore,  the  assessment  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  components  in  the  overall 
earnings dispersion is straightforward: the ratio 
2 2 / y µ σ σ  captures the relative importance of the 
permanent  component,  whereas  the  ratio 
2 2 / v y σ σ   captures  the  relative  importance  of  the 
transitory component.  
Notwithstanding  its  attractive  features,  the  empirical  evidence  rejected  the  rigid  restrictions 
imposed by model (1). One of the main drawbacks of model (1) is that it does not allow for 
changes  in earnings  inequality over time. Other studies ((Katz 1994;  Moffitt and Gottschalk 
1995) took the model complexity further by allowing the covariance structure of earnings to vary 
over time. To account for these time effects, these models considered also time specific loading 
factors or shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with 
calendar time.  
1 2 it t it t it Y v λ µ λ = +     (2) 
, 1,2 kt k λ =  are time-varying  factor  loadings on the permanent and transitory components of 
earnings. The variance of  it Y  implied by this model takes the form: 
2 2
1 2
2 2 ( )
t t it v Var Y µ λ σ λ σ = +     (3) 
An increase in either time loading factors generates an increase in the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality.  The  nature  of  the  change  in  inequality  depends  on  which  of  the  loading  factors 11 
 
changes. On the one hand, a persistent rise in  1t λ  increases the permanent or long-run inequality 
(inequality in earnings measured over a long period of time, such as lifetime earnings). As  1t λ  
can be interpreted as time-varying return to skills or skill price, its increase suggests that the 
relative  labour  market  advantage  of  high  skill  workers  is  enhanced.  In  this  situation,  the 
autocovariances grow in greater proportion that than the variance, causing the autocorrelation to 
increase. As a consequence, the increase in overall cross-sectional inequality is accompanied by 
a decrease in mobility. On the other hand, an increase in  2t λ  without a change in  1t λ  increases 
cross-sectional earnings inequality by increasing the transitory inequality, but without any impact 
on long-run or permanent inequality. In this situation the rise in the variances is not accompanied 
by a rise in the autocovariances, hence autocorrelations decrease and the increase in the overall 
inequality is accompanied by an increase in mobility. (Baker and Solon 2003) As pointed out by 
Katz and Autor (1999),  1t λ  maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but 
causes a persistent increase in the spread of the distribution and an increase in  2t λ  changes the 
rank  of  the  individual  in  the  short-run.  In  other  words  an  increase  in  the  time  parameters 
associated with the permanent component of earnings indicates a growing earnings inequality 
with no impact on the relative position of individuals in the distribution of permanent earnings, 
whereas an increase in the transitory time parameters indicates an increase in earnings mobility. 
Although model (2) incorporates changes over time in the permanent and temporary components 
of earnings inequality, it disregards other important features of earnings dynamics. Firstly, it 
disregards the cohort effects. As argued by Katz and Autor (1999), the increased wage inequality 
may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved labour quality within recent entry cohorts, 
resulting from unequal school quality. Some studies brought evidence against the hypothesis that 
the return to education is the same for different cohorts. These changes could be attributed either 12 
 
to the cohort effects or to the larger impact of the labour market shocks on younger than on older 
cohorts of workers. In the same line of thought, Freeman (1975) put forward the “active labour 
market”  hypothesis,  which  postulates  that  changes  in  the  labour  market  conditions,  such  as 
changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect mainly new entrants in the labour market. To 
account for these cohort effects, these models considered also cohort specific loading factors or 
shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with cohort.  
1 1 2 2 it c t it c t it Y v γ λ µ γ λ = +     (4) 
where , 1,2 jc j γ = are cohort specific loading factors. 
Secondly, regarding the permanent component, some studies brought evidence in favour of the 
“random growth rate model”
i or the “profile heterogeneity model”: (Hause 1977; Lillard and 
Weiss 1979;  MaCurdy 1982;  Baker 1997; Cappellari 2003; Sologon and O'Donoghue 2009) 
According to this model, which is consistent with labour market theories such as human capital, 
and  matching  models (Mincer 1974; Hause 1980), each  individual  has a unique age-earning 
profile with an individual specific intercept (initial earnings) and slope (earnings growth) that 
may be systematically related.  
An alternative/additional specification for the permanent component of earnings is the “random 
walk model”
ii or the “unit root model”, which is used in the literature to accommodate earnings 
shocks that might have permanent effects. (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Moffitt and 
Gottschalk 1995; Baker 1997; Dickens 2000; Sologon and O'Donoghue 2009).  
Thirdly, regarding the transitory component of earnings, previous research has brought evidence 
that transitory earnings might be serially correlated. Therefore, a more general autocorrelation 
structure is called for that relaxes the restriction on  ' it v s  from the canonical model. For the 13 
 
construction  of  such  a  structure,  longitudinal  studies  on  earnings  dynamics  turned  to  error 
processes from the literature on time series analysis. Based on MaCurdy (1982), the structure of 
the transitory component,  it v , is assumed to follow an ARMA(p,q) process
iii. 
2.3.2.  Earnings Mobility 
Another aspect relevant to the evolution of earnings differentials is earnings mobility, defined by 
Katz and Autor (1999) as the rate at which individuals shift positions in the earnings distribution. 
Earnings  mobility  is  closely  related  to  the  importance  of  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components in earnings variation. A large contribution of the permanent component implies that 
individual earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change their income 
position to a large extent experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. Therefore, the changes in 
earnings mobility are determined by the extent to which the changes in cross-sectional inequality 
are driven by changes in the permanent or transitory variance.  
Earnings mobility is a very complex phenomenon, and the ways of measuring it is diverse. In 
this  study,  we  look  at  the  degree  of  immobility,  which  is  measured  by  the  ratio  between 
permanent and transitory inequality and offers a summary of the evolution in the structure of 
inequality: a decrease (increase) in immobility is equivalent with a(n) decrease (increase) in the 
relative share of permanent differentials in overall inequality.  
A rise only in permanent inequality is associated with a decline in mobility rates. From a welfare 
perspective,  this  has  negative  implications  for  people  situated  at the  bottom  of  the  earnings 
distribution:  decreasing  mobility  rates  imply  decreasing  chances  of  improving  their  relative 
position in the distribution of lifetime earnings. Moreover, in a lifetime perspective the income 
gap between the top and the bottom widens. A rise only in transitory variance is associated with 14 
 
an increase in mobility, which is not expected to impact lifetime earnings inequality in the long 
run since transitory shocks are expected to fade away over time.  
A rise in transitory variance and a decrease in permanent variance imply increasing mobility 
rates, suggesting that the current combination of labour market and institutional factors has the 
potential of reducing lifetime earnings differentials.  
Equal proportional increases (decreases) in both components will leave mobility unchanged in 
spite of increasing (decreasing) overall cross-sectional instability. The first scenario has negative 
implications,  suggesting  that  the  increase  in  transitory  differentials  only  exacerbates  the 
permanent differentials, without helping  low-wage  individuals  improve their relative  lifetime 
earnings position. The second scenario implies that people’s ranking is maintained over lifetime, 
but the distance between the top and the bottom decreases, which does not have negative welfare 
implications.  
Decreasing permanent and transitory differentials, accompanied by an increase in mobility is the 
ideal  situation,  where  mobility  increases  as  a  result  of  a  larger  decrease  in  permanent 
differentials relative to transitory differentials. Thus the set of labour market institutional factors 
and  polices  are  very  effective  in  keeping  earnings  volatility  low  and  reducing  permanent 
earnings differentials between individuals, with a reducing effect on overall inequality. 
It becomes obvious that the question regarding the link between earnings mobility and earnings 
inequality does  not have  a straight  forward answer and  mobility  is  not always  beneficial. It 
depends on the underlying factors: “changes in earnings mobility could either work to offset or 
to increase changes in cross-sectional dispersion”, with very different implications for permanent 
earnings  inequality.  (1999)  Nonetheless,  no  controversy  surrounds  the  fact  that  mobility  is 15 
 
beneficial when it helps low paid individuals to improve their income position in the long-term 
income distribution.  
2.3.3.  Linking labour market policies and institutions with outcomes 
To  understand  the  differences  in  labour  market  outcomes  –  permanent  inequality,  transitory 
inequality and earnings mobility – across the 14 EU countries we relate to factors from the “SDI 
explanation of change” – the institutional setting. To our knowledge no study before tried to 
determine the possible links with the main labour market policy and institutions. Moreover, there 
is no specific theory that can explain this link. Therefore, we build our expectations based on 
existing labour market theories and empirical findings regarding the impact of the SDI factors on 
overall earnings inequality.  
The rise of inequality in the permanent component of earnings may be consistent with increasing 
returns to education, on-the-job training and other persistent abilities that are among the main 
determinants  of  the  permanent  component  of  earnings,  meaning  enhanced  relative  earnings 
position of the highly skilled individuals. (Mincer 1957; Mincer 1958; Mincer 1962; Mincer 
1974; Hause 1980). Thus the increase in permanent differentials may be driven by an increase in 
the relative demand for high-skilled labour which has outstripped the rise in supply.  
Among  the  factors  that  determine  shifts  in  relative  demand  are  skill-biased  technological 
changes, which enhances the relative earnings position of the highly-skilled workers, the increase 
in  prices  of  the  other  products,  which  imply  changes  in  product  demands,  and  forces  of 
globalization, such as reduction  in trade barriers and outsourcing.(Fortin and Lemieux 1997; 
Topel  1997)  A  possible  solution  to  the  economic  and  social  problem  of  rising  permanent 
earnings differentials is to enhance the supply of high skill labour through investment in human 16 
 
capital to match the rise in the demand. (Topel 1997) Shifts in the supply demand are determined 
by cohort variation, changes in access to education and immigration.  
Another factor is the change in the interest rate. Weizsacker (1993) analysed its influence on 
permanent inequality and concluded that an increase in the interest rate leads to a decrease in 
permanent inequality within the younger cohort and to a rise in permanent inequality in the older 
cohorts. 
As underlined by Katz and Autor (1999), the rise of earnings instability appears to be “a bit of a 
puzzle for hypotheses only emphasizing rising skills prices associated with increased growth in 
the demand for skills relative to the supply of skills”. However, some explanations could be 
formulated.  The  increase  in  the  inequality  of  the  transitory  component  of  earnings  may  be 
attributed  to  increased  earnings  exposure  to  macroeconomic  shocks  and/or  a  rise  in  the 
temporary  workforce  which  increases  earnings  exposure  to  shocks,  increased  labour  market 
instability,  increased  competitiveness,  globalization,  increasing  international  capital  mobility, 
and to the weakening of the labour market institutions (e.g. unions, government wage regulation, 
and internal labour markets) in filtering the impact of these shocks on earnings. (Rodrik 1997; 
Katz and Autor 1999)  
Some  of  the  factors  influencing  directly  permanent  inequality  might  impact  also  transitory 
inequality. E.g. a period of skill-biased technological change with the spread of new technologies 
can on the one hand increase the demand for skills, and on the other hand it can increase earnings 
instability, as firms might face uncertainty with respect to the abilities of the individual workers. 
(Katz and Autor 1999). 
Overall, the increase in the return to persistent skills is expected to have a much larger impact on 
long-run earnings inequality than an increase in the transitory component of earnings. (Katz and 17 
 
Autor 1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002) Across age groups, as postulated by Freeman’s (1975) 
“active labour market hypothesis”, similarly with overall income, supply and demand factors 
together with the other macroeconomic shocks are expected to have the largest effect on the 
youngest  generations  of  workers.  Moreover  the  limiting  impact  of  these  factors  on  both 
inequality  components  is  expected  to  be  lower  for  younger  workers,  which  have  a  weaker 
attachment to the labour market compared with senior workers. 
The discussion is summarized in Figure 1. Permanent earnings inequality within birth cohorts is 
the  result  of  the  interactions  between  ability  distributions,  lifecycle  decisions,  economic 
structures and labour market policy and institutions. Transitory inequality within birth cohorts is 
expected to be driven mainly by random macroeconomic and individual-specific shocks, but its 
final evolution depends on the ability of the labour market policy and institutions to minimize its 
increase. 
Once  we  account  for  all  these  factors  influencing  each  component,  the  complexity  of  the 
mechanism determining earnings mobility is revealed. The evolution of mobility, which reflects 
the evolution in the structure of inequality, depends on which component is influenced the most: 
an increase in mobility is triggered when transitory inequality becomes relatively more important 
than  permanent  differentials  in  the  composition  of  overall  inequality  and  people  manage  to 
change their position in the income distribution. An equal relative increase in both components 
suggests an increase in earnings instability with no change in mobility, which might point to an 
increase in persistent differentials which are exacerbated by transitory differentials. . 
Policies and Institutions – permanent effects 
Economic theory and previous empirical studies have identified a number of possible policy and 
institutional determinants of inequality. These include inter alia trade union bargaining power 18 
 
and  the  structure  of  collective  bargaining,  employment  protection  legislation  (EPL),  anti-
competitive product market regulation (PMR), taxes, active labour market policies (ALMPs) and 
unemployment benefits. We are going to investigate to what extent the patterns of changes in 
permanent earnings inequality, transitory earnings variability and earnings mobility are related to 
changes in these policy and institutional variables.  
(i)  Trade unions and the structure of collective bargaining 
Unionization  and  collective  bargaining  represents  an  important  institutional  factor  in  the 
determination of wages and implicitly earnings inequality. It is well recognized that the stated 
purpose of unions is to reduce earnings disparities and that covered workers earn significantly 
higher wages and have less volatile profiles than the uncovered ones. Hence, unionization could 
be expected to lower transitory differentials.  
Unions affect wage dispersion indirectly, mainly through their impact on training and minimum 
wage. By forcing employers to provide training to their employees, they increase the employees’ 
human  capital  and  adaptability  to  new  technologies.(Aghion  and  Williamson  2001)  Thus 
unionization stimulates earnings mobility and increases employees’ opportunity to improve their 
position  in the permanent earnings distribution.  Hence permanent earnings  inequality  can  be 
reduced at any given rate of technical change. (Aghion and Williamson 2001) In conclusion, 
unionization could be expected to lower both permanent and enhance earnings mobility.  
However, even if unions decrease within-group earnings disparities, it may still increase both 
overall  transitory  and  permanent  inequality  by  increasing  between-group  wage  differentials, 
meaning between those unionized and non-unionized. Thus, the impact of unionization depends 
also on the wage gap between unionized and non-unionised workers.  19 
 
Furthermore, strong trade unions have the ability to increase wages above market-clearing levels 
at the cost of lower employment, which affects mainly workers with more elastic labour supply, 
such  as  younger  workers,  women  and  older  workers.  (Bertola,  Blau  et  al.  2002)  Hence,  by 
pushing these workers out of the labour market, both components might be expected to decrease 
for those still in the labour market. Similarly with overall inequality, because of these potentially 
offsetting effects, the impact of unionization on permanent differentials, transitory differentials 
and earnings mobility can only be resolved empirically.(Fortin and Lemieux 1997) 
Existing studies brought evidence that a high union density is usually associated with a low 
overall earnings inequality, which results from claims for high wages and earnings stability for 
covered workers. OECD (2004) 
Nonetheless,  it  has  long  been  argued  that,  in  practice,  union  influence  on  wage  formation 
depends on the structure of collective bargaining. On the one hand, a low degree of corporatism, 
meaning a decentralized wage bargaining at the firm level is expected to prevent excessive wage 
claims since this would lead to a loss of market shares to competitors with detrimental effects on 
employment. This  implies that wages are  less uniformly distributed, meaning that there  is a 
higher dispersion in the returns to skills and in earnings variability.(Bassanini and Duval 2006) 
Therefore we can expect countries with low degrees of corporatism to display high levels of 
permanent earnings inequality, a high variability and a high degree of earnings mobility.  
The impact of coupling a high union density with low corporatism can be argued either way. On 
the one hand, a high or increasing union density could decrease the level of the high permanent 
and transitory inequality associated with low corporatism and might stimulate earnings mobility. 
On the other hand, even if union density increases, in the absence of coordination, this might 
lead to even higher permanent and transitory differentials. Moreover, as mentioned above, the 20 
 
wage gap between those unionized and those non-unionized is expected to play a significant role 
as well in determining the final outcome. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  very  high  degree  of  corporatism,  meaning  a  very  centralized  and 
coordinated  bargaining  system  is  associated  with  a  compressed  wage  structure  across 
qualification levels because it is expected to exclude low skilled workers from the labour market. 
(Calmfors, 1993). Therefore we can expect permanent and transitory earnings inequality and 
mobility to be lower the higher is the degree of centralization/coordination and the effect to be 
stronger the stronger the unionization. Again, the union-non-union wage gap might play a role. 
Nonetheless, a very high degree of corporatism is more likely to lead to wage modernization, 
because they induce unions to internalize the detrimental macroeconomic effects of excessive 
wage  pressure  by  restraining  the  wage  demands.  In  this  situation  the  degree  of  permanent 
inequality  under  high  corporatism  might  be  similar  as  under  low  corporatism.  Thus  the 
relationship between the degree of corporatism and wages may not be monotonic, but follow a 
“U-shaped” pattern, similar with employment.  
For employment, an intermediate level of corporatism is expected to trigger the worst labour 
market  outcomes,  as  they  do  not  benefit  from  either  of  the  advantages  of  low  and  high 
corporatism:  when  bargaining  takes  place  at  the  firm  level  (without  coordination),  the  high 
elasticity of demand in the product market implies that any price increase resulting from higher 
wages  would  result  in  severe  drops  both  in  output  and  employment.  By  contrast,  when  the 
bargaining takes place at the  industry  level, unions are able to secure higher wages  because 
product demand elasticity is generally lower, given the lower substitution possibilities compared 
with  the  firm  level.  (Bassanini  and  Duval  2006);  Calmfors  and  Driffill,  1988).  Thus  it  is 
reasonable to expect both higher transitory and permanent differentials for intermediate levels of 21 
 
corporatism compared with low and high levels. Given the high earnings volatility, we might 
expect also higher levels of earnings mobility for intermediate corporatism compared with the 
other two.  
(ii)  Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
EPL is one of the factors which affect the elasticity of labour demand to the bargained wage. It is 
considered to be a key factor in generating labour market rigidity by incurring costs to employers 
when dismissing workers. Two consequences emerge. On the one hand, employers might offer 
lower wages in order to compensate for the firing costs. On the other hand, employees might feel 
better  protected  and  push  for  higher  wages,  which  in  turn  puts  a  pressure  on  employers. 
Employers will reduce hiring rates, thus increase unemployment spells. Consequently, the cost of 
unemployment becomes too high, which might create an incentive for employees to accept lower 
wages to maintain their wage. Hence the equilibrium is restored. (Blanchard 1999) Therefore, 
theory predicts that EPL increases the cost of hiring and of layoffs, and consequently lowers 
labour turnover, which  might reduce transitory  inequality and  earnings  mobility, and wages, 
which might reduce permanent inequality. This is consistent with OECD (2004) findings, which 
state that a strict EPL is usually associated with a low overall inequality. Moreover, the low 
turnover is expected to affect mainly workers with temporary contracts, because they have a 
weaker protection in the labour market.  
In  conclusion,  an  increase  in  the  strictness  of  the  EPL  can  be  expected  to  decrease  both 
permanent and transitory earnings inequality and earnings mobility. However, the overall impact 
of the EPL depends on the difference  in regulating regular (EPLR) and temporary contracts 
(EPLT), which affects the labour market structure with respect to the type of contract. A higher 22 
 
share of transitory contracts is expected to bring along a higher transitory inequality, given the 
higher exposure of these workers to the economic shocks.  
If a strict EPLR coexists with a low EPLT, this represents a strong disincentive for employers to 
train temporary workers, as the cost of their layoff is low. Consequently, temporary workers are 
trapped in this type of contracts, without a chance towards permanent contracts, meaning without 
a chance towards increasing their human capital and, at the same time, facing more earnings 
instability under the impact of macroeconomic shocks. However, this type of earnings instability 
is not expected to increase mobility rates that could help these individuals improve their relative 
position in the distribution of lifetime earnings. At the same time, workers with a permanent 
contract might benefit  from  higher  bargaining power and  might push towards higher wages. 
Thereby,  permanent  differentials  and  earnings  instability  are  expected  to  be  enhanced,  and 
earnings mobility to be reduced by an increase in the relative difference between EPLR and 
EPLT.  
(iii)  Tax wedge 
An  increase  in the tax wedge, defined as the sum of the personal  income tax and all  social 
security contributions as a percentage of total labour cost, results in employers paying more and 
employees receiving less. The resulting impact on permanent inequality is twofold. On the one 
hand, tax wedge influences permanent inequality through its influence on human capital price. 
An increase in the tax wedge lowers human capital price. Weizsacker (1993) proved within the 
context of an explicit comparative dynamic inequality analysis that a decrease in human capital 
price results in a decrease in permanent inequality within age groups.  
On the other hand, an increase in the tax wedge suggests that the cost to employers increases to a 
larger extent than the increase of the wage offered. This has detrimental effects especially for 23 
 
employment, pushing minimum wage workers, for which the rise in payroll taxes cannot be 
shifted onto, into unemployment. (Bassanini and Duval 2006) Thus an increase in the tax wedge 
is expected to push low wage workers into unemployment and to decrease permanent earnings 
inequality  for the working population. These effects might be exacerbated by  strong unions. 
Similarly with the findings for employment, its effects are expected to depend also on the degree 
of corporatism. No direct effect is expected on transitory income.  
(iv)  Product market regulation (PMR) 
A  good  example  of  the  impact  of  product  market  regulation  on  wage  inequality  is  the 
comparison  between  public  and  private  sector: the  public  sector,  which  is  highly  regulated, 
displays a more compressed earnings structure. Hence, we expect highly regulated sectors to 
display reduced permanent and transitory differentials. 
Lower product market regulations (PMR) are expected to determine an increase in competition 
in  the  previously  regulated  sectors,  and  consequently  lower  market  rents,  which  in  turn 
determine lower wage claims, aimed to close the gap between productivity and real wages that 
generates unemployment. Therefore a decrease in product market regulation is expected to shift 
labour demand, increase its elasticity to wages, increase the returns to skills, and consequently 
increase permanent differentials in the previously regulated sectors. At the same time, increased 
competition  is  expected  to  increase  transitory  inequality.  In  the  same  line  of  thought,  more 
competitive environments are expected to determine higher levels of earnings mobility. 
These effects might hold in the previously regulated sectors, but the impact on the overall level 
of inequality, including also those which were not regulated, might be different. The final effect 
depends on a large extent on the ex-ante wage gap between regulated and non-regulated sectors. 
Moreover, interaction effects with other institutions cannot be neglected. For example, previous 24 
 
findings showed that the effect of deregulation on wage differentials depend on union density 
and the degree of corporatism. For example, Fortin and Lemieux (1997) found that deregulation 
increases overall inequality, but the effect is larger among unionized male workers.  
(v)  Active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
Active Labour Market Programs (ALMP), which typically consist of job placement services and 
labour market programmes such as job-search, vocational training or hiring subsidies can reduce 
permanent earnings differentials by improving the efficiency of the job matching process and by 
enhancing the work experience and skills of the unemployed. Thus by increasing human capital 
of  low wage  individuals and decreasing permanent wage differentials,  ALMP  is expected to 
increase  their  wage  mobility,  helping  them  improve  their  position  in  the  distribution  of 
permanent earnings.  
However, these reintegrated workers are the ones with least protection in the labour market and 
they are expected to be the  most affected  by  macroeconomic shocks. Hence,  in the  face of 
macroeconomic shocks, their presence in the labour market might exacerbate permanent and 
transitory differentials. 
Another aspect to be considered are interactions with other factors: the effects of the ALMP 
depend on the other labour market policies and institutions. For example, a strict EPL is expected 
to dampen the effect of active labour market policies aimed to reintegrate the unemployed into 
the labour market (Bassanini and Duval 2006). On the one hand, the increase in the ALMP 
increases  employability  and  on  the  other  hand  the  low  EPL  facilitates  their  labour  market 
reintegration. Hence, an  increase  in  ALMP coupled with a  low or decreasing EPL could be 
expected to reduce permanent differentials and increase earnings mobility.  25 
 
(vi)  Unemployment benefits 
The  expected  impacts  of  the  unemployment  benefits  on  labour  market  outcomes  are  not  so 
straightforward. On the one hand, generous unemployment benefits are expected to weaken the 
job-search intensity and decrease the employability and human capital for the unemployed, thus 
increase permanent differentials. Moreover, generous unemployment benefits are expected to 
increase  the  economic  cost  of  employment,  which  in  turn  may  put  an  upward  pressure  on 
worker’s wage claims and exacerbate the increase in permanent earnings dispersion. 
On the other hand, longer and more generous unemployment benefits represent incentives not to 
accept low-paid jobs and improve the job-matching, thus increasing the likelihood of a more 
stable employment and earnings patterns. (Bassanini and Duval 2006) In this situation, both 
transitory and permanent differentials are expected to be reduced. Moreover, if they are coupled 
with active labour market programs they are expected to increase human capital even further, 
thereby reducing permanent differentials.  
Regarding the interactions between all these policy and institutional factors that are expected to 
impact permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility, based on the standard 
wage-setting/price-setting (WS/PS) model (Layard, Nickell et al. 1991), any factor that affects 
the  slope  of  the  wage-setting  curve  -  the  elasticity  of  wage  claims  to  employment  (e.g. 
unemployment benefits, unionization, degree of corporatism, PMR) and/or the slope of the price-
setting curve – elasticity of labour demand to bargaining wage (e.g EPL, PMR, tax wedge) may 
be expected to interact with policies and institutions that affect the level of the wage-setting - 
level of wage claims (e.g. unemployment benefits) and the level of price-setting curve – level of 
labour demand (e.g. PMR). (Bassanini and Duval 2006)  26 
 
Similar with the conclusions reached by Bassanini and Duval (2006) regarding the impact of the 
labour market institutional and policy factors, the overall lessons that emerge are that, in theory, 
all  possible  interactions  across  policies  and  institutions  can  affect  permanent  inequality, 
transitory inequality and earnings mobility. And which policies complement each other should 
be established empirically.  
Interactions between polices, institutions and macroeconomic shocks – temporary effects 
From what has been presented so far, policies and institutions appear to play a major role in 
shaping  primarily  permanent  differentials  and  earnings  mobility.  However,  for  transitory 
differentials and earnings mobility a big part of the story is missing. Besides their permanent 
effects, policies and institutions may also have a temporary impact via their interactions with a 
series of  macroeconomic shocks which  have affected the OECD countries. We are going to 
consider the impact of globalization, technological changes, interest rate, labour demand shocks, 
aggregate supply and demand shocks. These macroeconomic shocks are expected to explain to a 
larger  extent  the  evolution  of  the  transitory  variance  and  earnings  mobility  compared  with 
permanent variance, which appears to be shaped at a larger extent by institutional and policy 
factors. 
The effects of these shocks on all three elements are expected to be “filtered” by the labour 
market policies and institutions, which are put in place to protect earnings against the exposure to 
the possible adverse effects of these shocks. 
We expect that strong unionization, a high degree of corporatism, strict EPL, strict PMR and 
high unemployment benefits will have a dampening effect on the sensitivity of wages to general 
economic conditions, thus limiting the increase or even reducing transitory variance, and thus 
reducing earnings mobility. The effectiveness of these policies and institutions is expected to be 27 
 
lower for the youngest cohort compared with more experienced workers, as younger workers are 
expected to be affected the most by demand and supply shocks.   
3.  DATA 
The estimation of the permanent variance, transitory  variance and  earnings  mobility  is done 
using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
iv over the period 1994-2001 for 14 EU 
countries. Not all countries are present for all waves. Luxembourg and Austria are observed 
between 1995 and 2001 and Finland between 1996 and 2001. Following the tradition of previous 
studies, the analysis focuses only on men. 
A  special  problem  with  panel  data  is  that  of  attrition  over  time,  as  individuals  are  lost  at 
successive  dates  causing  the  panel  to  decline  in  size  and  raising  the  problem  of 
representativeness. Several papers analysed the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in 
ECHP. Behr, Bellgardt and Rendtel (2005) found that the extent and the determinants of panel 
attrition vary between countries and across waves within one country, but these differences do 
not bias the analysis of income or the ranking of the national results. Ayala, Navrro and Sastre 
(2006)  assessed  the  effects  of  panel  attrition  on  income  mobility  comparisons  for  some  EU 
countries from ECHP. The results show that ECHP attrition is characterized by a certain degree 
of  selectivity,  but  only  affecting  some  variables  and  some  countries.  Moreover,  the  income 
mobility indicators show certain sensitivity to the weighting system.  
In  this  paper,  the  weighting  system  applied  to  correct  for  the  attrition  bias  is  the  one 
recommended by Eurostat, namely using the “base weights” of the last wave observed for each 
individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10. The dataset is scaled up to a multiplicative constant
v 
of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual. 28 
 
For the empirical analysis, individuals are categorized into four birth cohorts, which are followed 
through time. Ideally, one should use birth cohorts formed from people born in a particular year. 
The limited number of observations forces us to group more birth years in one birth cohort. The 
first birth cohort are people born between 1940-1950, the second one people born between 1951-
1960, the third cohort people born between 1961-1970 and lastly people born between 1971-
1981. This grouping allows the analysis of the earnings covariance structure for individuals of 
the same age, followed at different points in time.  
For this study we use real log hourly wage adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 57, born 
between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher 
than  1  Euro  were  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  resulting  sample  for  each  country  is  an 
unbalanced panel. The choice of using unbalanced panels for estimating the covariance structure 
of  earnings  is  motivated  by  the  need  to  mitigate  the  potential  overestimation  of  earnings 
persistence that would arise from balanced panels where the estimation is based only on people 
that have positive earnings for the entire sample period.  
Details on the number of observations and mean yearly hourly earnings are provided in Table 1. 
Mean hourly earnings appear to increase in all countries except for Austria where it records a 
slight decrease. Based on Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009), the highest attrition rates from one 
year to the next are recorded in Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, where, on average, 
less than 60% of those who were in the sample in the previous year reported positive earnings in 
the current year. For more descriptive statistics please refer to Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009).  
The link between the evolution of the two inequality components and the labour market policies 
and institutions is investigated using the estimated components from the first part of the analysis 
and the OECD data on the labour market indicators, which is a combination of two data sets. The 29 
 
first dataset is the one used by Bassanini and Duval (2006)
 vi and the second one is the Lindert-
Allard OECD data set 1950-2001
vii.  
The  following  institutional  variables  are  included  in  the  analysis:  employment  protection 
legislation overall (EPL), for temporary (EPLT) and for regular contracts (EPLR), the relative 
difference between EPLR and EPLT, trade union density, product market regulation (PMR), tax 
wedge, degree of corporatism, degree of bargaining coverage, average unemployment benefit 
replacement  rate  and  spending  on  active  labour  market  programmes  (ALMP).  The 
macroeconomic shock variables included are: labour demand shock, terms of trade shock, total 
factor  production  shock,  real  interest  shock,  aggregate  demand  shock  and  aggregate  supply 
shock. These variables are observed at the country level, over the period 1994-2001. 
A description of the variables is included in Table 2. For a more detailed description, please refer 
to Bassanini and Duval (2006)
 and the Lindert-Allard OECD data sets 1950-2001. The summary 
statistics of the institutional variables and shock variables are illustrated in Table 3. Luxembourg 
and Greece have some missing institutional and shock variables and they are dropped from the 
final estimations. Portugal, Denmark and Ireland record some missing values for labour demand 
shock.  
Additional control variables by cohort are included in the final estimations estimation: the share 
of university degrees, the share of upper-secondary degrees, share of permanent contracts, share 
of private employees and  share of employees  by occupation. The  summary  statistics  for the 





4.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  twofold:  first, to  fit  a  parsimonious  model  to the  autocovariance 
structure of earnings for all cohorts and for all countries, decompose overall earnings inequality 
into  its  permanent  and  transitory  components  and  compute  earnings  immobility;  second  to 
estimate the relationship between these estimated components and the main labour market policy 
and institutional factors. 
4.1.Econometric specifications and Estimation methods of covariance structures 
4.1.1.  Econometric Earnings Specification 
The methodology used to estimate earnings inequality, its permanent and transitory component, 
and earnings mobility by cohorts and for each country follows Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009; 
2009). This paper represents a follow-up of their analysis. Basically, we use the same data and 
the models identified by Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009; 2009) as the best fit for each country 
to  estimate  the  two  inequality  components  and  earnings  mobility.  A  summary  of  this 
methodology is provided below. 
The  inspection of the  covariance  structure of earnings,  included  in  section 5.1, suggests the 
following features of the data, which must be incorporated in the model: 
(vii)  the elements of the autocovariance structure decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate and  
(viii)  they converge gradually at a positive level;  
(ix)  the lag-1 autocovariance drops to a larger extent compared with higher order 
autocovariances, which decline more gradually;  
(x)  the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, so they cannot be 
assumed to be stationary over sample period;  31 
 
(xi)  the autocovariances vary with age controlling for the period effect, hence they cannot be 
assumed to be stationary over the life cycle;  
(xii)  the variance covariance structure appears to be cohort specific. 
Each  of  the  above  features  are  incorporated  in  the  general  model.  Feature  (i)  suggests  the 
presence of an AR(1) process, but the presence of feature (iii) calls for an ARMA (1, 1) process. 
Feature (ii) can be captured by the presence of the permanent component. Feature (vi) is captured 
by incorporating period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent individual component 
and the transitory component of earnings are allowed to vary with time. The life cycle non-
stationarity of the autocovariance structure of earnings mentioned in feature (v) can be captured 
by modelling the permanent individual component as random walk and/or random growth in age. 
Cohort  heterogeneity  is  incorporate  by  parameters  that  allow  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components to vary between cohorts. 
The following general specification encompasses all the relevant aspects of earnings dynamics 
considered above.  
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ict Y  is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the i-th individual, from the c-th cohort in 
the t-th year,  ct Y is the year-cohort specific mean and  ict r  is an error term which represents the 
individual-specific deviation from the year-cohort specific mean. The demeaned earnings  ict r  are 32 
 
assumed  to  be  independently  distributed  across  individuals,  but  autocorrelated  over  time. 
Earnings  differentials  within  each  cohort  can  be  characterised  by  modelling  the  covariance 
structure of individual earnings  0 ( ) ( , ), 0,..., ict ict ict s c c VarCov Y E r r s T t − = = − .
viii 
Based  on  equation  (5),  earnings  can  be  decomposed  into  a  permanent  component 
1 1 [ ] c t i i it iat age u γ λ µ ϕ + +  and a transitory component  2 2 c t it v γ λ . The component  i i it age µ ϕ +  models 
an individual profile heterogeneity as a function of age, called also a random growth (see (Baker 
1997), (Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995)), where  i µ  and  i ϕ  are time invariant individual intercept 
and slopes with variance 
2
µ σ  and
2
ϕ σ . Besides the random vector of intercepts and slopes       ( , ) i i µ ϕ  
the  parameterization  of  individual  earnings  dynamics  includes  also  a  random  walk  process 
(Equation (6)). (Moffit and Gottschalk (1995), Baker and Solon (2003)) The variance of the first 
period shock (assumed to be at age 20, which is also the lowest age observed in our dataset) is 
estimated together with the 
2
µ σ
 and is considered part of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Equation (7) specifies the transitory component of earnings which evolves as an ARMA(1,1) 
process, where the serial correlation  ρ parameter captures the decreasing rate of decay of the 
covariances with the lag, the moving-average parameter θ  captures the sharp drop of the lag-1 
autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances, and  it ε  are white-noise mean-reverting 
transitory shocks. The variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the volatility of shocks at the start of the sample 
period for each cohort, 
2
ε σ  the volatility of shocks in subsequent years and ρ the persistence of 
shocks. Measurement error in this model is captured by the transitory component. 
When  working  with  ARMA(p,q)  processes  in  the  context  of  panel  data,  MaCurdy  (1981), 
MaCurdy (1982) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underlined the need for the treatment of initial 33 
 
conditions
ix. Following MaCurdy (1981), MaCurdy (1982) and Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009; 
2009), we treat the initial transitory variances of the 4 cohorts as 4 additional parameters to be 
estimated. 
The non-stationary pattern of earnings is accommodated using time specific loading factors, both 
on the permanent and transitory component of earnings,  , 1,2; 0,7 kt k t λ = = , normalized to 1 in the first 
wave for identification
x. Cohort heterogeneity is accommodated by allowing both the permanent 
and the transitory component to vary with the cohort.  , 1,2 jc j γ =  are cohort loading factor, 
normalized to 1 for the cohort born in 1940-1949 for identification. 
4.1.2.  Specification and Estimation of the Covariance Structure of Earnings  
Following Sologon & O’Donoghue (2009), the covariance structure for the first sample period 
takes the form: 
2 2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0, ( ) ( ) ( ) 2cov( ) ( ) ( 20) ) 0 ic ic ic i i i i c Var Y E r r E age E age a if t µ ϕ π σ σ µϕ σ σ = = + + + − + =  (8) 
The covariance structure for subsequent years can be expressed as follows: 
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Basically the parameters that are estimated are:
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 0, , , , ,cov( ), , , , , , , c t i i c t c µ ϕ π ε γ λ σ σ µϕ σ γ λ ρ θ σ σ  34 
 
The parameters of the models are fit to the covariance structure for each cohort by country using 
equally weighted minimum distance methods of estimation. The methodology used is the same 
as that utilized by Cappellari (2003), Baker and Solon (2003), Ramos (2003), Kalwij and Alessie 
(2003), Dickens (2000), Baker (1997), Abowd and Card (1989), Cervini, Ramos (2006) and 
Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009) adapted to unbalanced panels.  
This paper used only the specification that fit the data the best for each country, as found by 
Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009). For the full description on the methodology and the strategy 
on selecting the model for each country, please refer to Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009). 
4.2.Estimation of the links between policy, institutions and outcomes 
This section describes the methodology used to estimate the relationships between labour market 
policy  and  institutional  factors as  independent variables and permanent  inequality, transitory 
inequality and earnings mobility, as dependent variables. Each model is estimated independently, 
for all cohorts and countries pooled together. The unit of analysis is the cohort. Hence we have 
four cohorts for each country, observed over 1994-2001
xi. 
The analysis follows a general to specific strategy. First, we test weather policies interact with 
the overall institutional framework, controlling for the cohorts effects and for all the unobserved 
shocks. Second, we test whether there are any specific interactions between different institutional 
factors, and between the institutional factors and the observed aggregate shocks in shaping the 
pattern of the two inequality components and earnings mobility.  
4.2.1.  Systemic Interactions 
In  macroeconomic  equations  interactions  between  institutions  are  usually  specified  in  a 
multiplicative form between deviations of institutions from their sample mean, which enables the 35 
 
interpretation of the marginal effects of each institution when the others are kept constant at the 
sample mean. Before analysing the specific cross-interactions between all institutions, we want 
to get a grasp of the systemic interactions, meaning the interactions between each institution and 
the overall institutional setting. 
Systemic  reform  complementarity  patterns  are  explored  by  estimating  a  separate  non-linear 
equation for each labour market outcome, pooling all cohorts, where each institution is interacted 
with the overall institutional framework, defined as the sum of the direct effects of institutions. 
1 1 1
( ( )( ( ))
K J K
it c t k kit j kit k k kit k i it
k j k
y X X X X X v δ τ υ ϕ υ µ
= = =
= + − − + + ∑ ∑ ∑   (12) 
it y  represents the labour market outcomes -permanent variance, temporary variance and wage 
immobility  of  the  cohort  i  in  year  t.  The  parameters  k υ ,  j ϕ ,  c δ   and  t τ   are  estimated 
simultaneously.  k υ  denotes the direct effect of  institution  k X  on  it y , for a country with an 
average  mix  of  policies  and  institutions,  while  j ϕ   indicates  the  strength  of  the  interaction 
between  k X  and the overall institutional framework, expressed as the sum of direct effect of 
policies and institutions, expressed in deviation form in the interaction.  k X  is measured at the 
country  level.  A  negative  and  significant  effect  suggests  that  there  is  a  systemic  reform 
complementarity  between  k X   and  the  overall  framework  in  reducing  permanent  variance, 
temporary variance and earnings immobility, at the cohort level.  c δ  and  t τ  represent cohort and 
respectively period shifters, which capture cohorts heterogeneity and all the unobserved shocks 
that might affect permanent variance, transitory variance and earnings immobility by altering the 
slopes of the direct and indirect effects.  
The estimation results are included in Table 8.
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4.2.2.  Specific 2-by-2 interactions between institutions, and between institutions and 
shocks 
This  section  attempts  to open  the  black  box  of  the  systemic  interactions  investigated  in  the 
previous  section  and  explore  the  specific  interactions  between  institutions  and  between 
institutions  and  shocks,  which  are  expected  to  shape  the  pattern  of  permanent  inequality, 
transitory inequality and earnings mobility. We start with a relatively simple model in which we 
explore  the  direct  effect  of  institutions,  shocks  and  the  interactions  between  shocks  and 
institutions.  Moreover,  we  allow  the  effects  to  differ  by  cohorts  to  account  for  cohort 
heterogeneity. The model is expressed as follows: 
1 1 1
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− ∑  is a set of observed macroeconomic shocks expressed in deviation from 
their mean, which are interacted with policy and institutional factors.  c δ ,  k υ ,  s ψ  and  k γ  are 
estimated simultaneously. As before  c δ  represent the cohort shifters, normalized to 1 for the 
oldest cohort for identification,  k υ  represents the direct effect of institution  k X  when the other 
intuitions and shocks are at their sample means,  s ψ  captures the direct effects of shocks and  k γ  
capture  the  interaction  effects  between  institution  k X   and  the  aggregate  effects  of 
macroeconomic shocks. The estimation results are presented in Table 9. 
The  final  model augments  model (13) by  adding also the 2-by-2  interaction effects between 
institutions and policies. Moreover, additional controls are added, which are aimed to control for 
educational  structure  (proportions  of  university  and  upper-secondary  graduates),  for  sector 
structure (proportion of private employees), for the structure of the type of contract (proportion 37 
 
of employees with a permanent contract), for the structure of employment status (proportion of 
unemployed) and for occupational structure, by cohort. The estimation results are presented in 
Table 10 
One note needs to be made.  i µ  captures the unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity, in our case 
cohort-specific  heterogeneity.  One  might  argue  that  our  model  suffers  from  unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. We tested for unobserved heterogeneity for each model, by cohort, using the 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects. The test rejected the presence 
of unit-specific effects at 5% level of confidence. 
Another problem is the endogeneity between institutions and overall inequality that is expected 
to  be  transferred  to  the  estimation  of  the  two  inequality  components.  The  lack  of  good 
instruments  prevented  us  from  correcting  for  this  problem.  Hence,  our  estimates  should  be 
interpreted with caution as they might be biased. 
5.  RESULTS - DESCRIPTIVE 
5.1.The dynamic autocovariance structure of hourly earnings 
We begin with the description of the dynamic structure of individual log hourly earnings for all 
14 countries under analysis. This description is used to confirm that the model used to fit the 
autocovariance structure of earnings for all cohorts is consistent with the trends observed in the 
dynamic autocovariance structure. For a full description of the overall and cohort autocovariance 
structure  of  earnings  please  refer  to  Sologon  and  O'Donoghue  (2009).  The  overall 
autocovariance structure of earnings is presented in Figure 2. We summarize the main findings 
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The overall autocovariance structure of earnings displays both similar and diverging patterns 
across countries. In the beginning of the sample period, the overall inequality appears to be the 
highest in Portugal, followed by Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, UK, Greece, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. The variance of log hourly earnings 
appears  to  decrease  over  the  sample  period  in  Germany,  Denmark,  Belgium,  France,  UK, 
Ireland,  Spain  and  Austria,  to  increase  in  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Greece,  Portugal  and 
Finland. At the end of the sample period, Portugal still records the highest inequality, followed 
by  Luxembourg,  France,  Greece,  Spain,  UK,  Italy,  Germany,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  Finland, 
Belgium, Austria and Denmark.  
In summary, the description of the dynamic structure of individual earnings for men for each 
country suggests five main common features of the data, which were incorporated in our model, 
as mentioned previously: 
•  First, the covariance elements are not the same at all lags. They decrease with the lag at a 
decreasing  rate  and  converge  gradually  at  a  positive  level,  suggesting  the  presence  of  a 
transitory element which is serially correlated and of a permanent individual component of 
earnings. The most popular specification for the serially correlated term is the AR(1) process. 
However, the fact that the lag-1 autocovariance drops to a larger extent compared with the 
other autocovariances and that the autocovariances at high orders decline very slowly suggest 
that earnings cannot be modelled simply as a first-order autoregressive process. Therefore a 
an ARMA (p=1, q=1) process might be a better choice, where p represents the order of the 
autoregressive process and q the order of the moving average process.  
•  Second, as the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, they cannot 
be assumed to be stationary over sample period. The stationarity assumption was tested and 39 
 
rejected using the methodology introduced by  MaCurdy (1982). One way to capture this 
feature is to incorporate period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent individual 
component and the transitory component of earnings are allowed to vary with time.  
•  Third, as autocovariances  vary with age controlling  for the period effect, they cannot be 
assumed  to  be  stationary  over  the  life  cycle.  This  non-stationarity  can  be  captured  by 
modelling the permanent individual component as random walk and/or random growth in 
age.  
•  Lastly,  the  variance-covariance  structure  appears  to  be  cohort  specific,  which  can  be 
incorporated  by  parameters  that  allow  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  to  vary 
between cohorts.  
5.2.The evolution of the main labour market and institutional factors 
This section presents the evolution of the main labour market policy and institutional variables 
that will be used to explain the differences in labour market outcomes – permanent inequality, 
transitory inequality and earnings mobility – across the 14 EU countries.  
The evolution of the labour market policy and institutional factors is summarized in Figure 3 
Over the period 1994-2001, the OECD index of employment protection legislation decreased in 
most countries under analysis, except for Austria, France, Ireland and Greece, where  it was 
constant and UK, where it increased slightly. Employment protection legislation (EPL) exhibited 
a sharp turnaround around 1995 in Denmark, 1996 in Portugal, 1997 in Belgium, Germany and 
Spain,  1999  in  Netherlands,  2000  in  Finland,  which  marked  the  year  when  EPL  started 
decreasing. For Italy the decrease continued through the rest of the period, whereas for the others 40 
 
the evolution was roughly stable. An increase in EPL was recorded in Spain in 2001 and in 
Ireland in 2000.  
Employment protection legislation for regular contracts (EPLR) did not change much, except for 
Spain and Finland, where it decreased in 1997, respectively in 2001, and France and UK, where 
it increased in 2000, respectively in 1999.  
The  greatest  changes  were  recorded  for  employment  protection  legislation  for  temporary 
contracts (EPLT). A decrease was recorded in Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, Italy and 
Netherland, and an increase in Spain. The rest remained constant. Denmark recorded a sharp 
drop in 1995, Belgium and Germany in 1997, Italy in 1997-1998, Portugal in 1996, Netherlands 
in 1998.  
As a result, an increasing or stagnant positive relative difference between EPL for permanent 
contracts and for temporary contracts was recorded in Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, 
UK and Finland. Drastic changes occurred in Denmark, Germany and Netherlands around 1995, 
1997, respectively 1999. Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Greece exhibited a less strict EPL for 
permanent contracts compared with temporary contracts for the entire period, which appears to 
decrease in absolute value, except for Spain and Greece, where it was constant.  
A  decrease  in  union  density  is  reported  in  all  countries,  except  Belgium.  The  degree  of 
corporatism was characterized by stable rates in all countries. The tax wedge exhibited a high 
turnaround in 1995 for all the countries, except the continental ones. The largest decline was in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries,  followed  by Nordic and Mediterranean countries. Exceptions are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and France, where the tax wedge increased. The index of product 
market regulation (PMR) declined through the entire period, but the rate of decrease appears to 
intensify after 1998 for most countries. Unemployment benefits replacement rates rose in all 41 
 
countries, except Denmark, Finland and UK. Sharp increases were recorded around 1998-1999 
in Italy and Portugal, and around 2000-2001 in France and Ireland. Active labour market policies 
(ALMP) developed in all countries, except Germany, where it decreased. The largest increases 
were recorded in Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland.  
The possible static effects of these policies are raising employment and reducing productivity, 
whereas the possible dynamic effects are raising investment following the raise in employment 
and raising incentives for adoption of new technologies, which implies a shift in the demand for 
skills. (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008) Hence all these are expected to influence permanent 
earnings inequality and volatility and earnings mobility. 
Nevertheless, institutional factors do not exist in a vacuum. They are expected to interact with 
external factors, such as macroeconomic shocks. The evolution of the macroeconomic shocks 
illustrated in Figure 4. Changes in demand and supply factors, in technology, in terms of trade, in 
real interest do not differ significantly among countries; hence they cannot by themselves explain 
all the changes in the inequality components. These trends are not surprising, given that all these 
countries operate in the same world markets, with similar technology, industry and occupation 
mixes.  
For example, all countries experience the same turning points in both demand and supply shocks. 
The supply shocks had three turning points: a decrease until 1996, followed by a decrease until 
1998, an increase until 2000, and a drop thereafter. The supply shocks converged in a decreasing 
trend for all countries towards 1999, followed by an increase in 2000, and a slight decrease in 
2001. The convergence in the trends was maintained until 2001. Overall, the highest demand and 
supply shocks are experienced by Ireland, followed by Belgium, Austria and Netherlands.  42 
 
One country stands out with respect to its evolution in total production factors shock: Ireland. It 
records a sharp increase until 1997, followed by stabilization towards 2001. Similarly for the real 
interest shock, which drops towards 1998 and stabilizes afterwards. These trends are most likely 
related to the Celtic Tiger.  
The OECD data on education attainment by country reveals that the average level of education 
has an increasing trend and evolves parallel for all countries. Three clusters can be identified. A 
high average level is achieved in Germany, followed by Finland, Denmark, then very closely 
Ireland, UK and Belgium.  A  medium  level of  medium  level  is recorded  in Greece, Austria, 
France, Spain and Italy. The lowest level is in Portugal.  
To sum up, labour market policy and institutional factors are expected to interact significantly 
with  each  other  and  with  the  macroeconomic  shocks  in  shaping  the  patterns  of  permanent 
inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility.  43 
 
6.  RESULTS OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURE ESTIMATION 
6.1.Estimation results 
The  general  specification  of  the  error  component  model  outlined  in  section  4.1.2  that 
encompasses all relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above is fit to the elements of 
the covariance matrix for all four cohorts pooled together
xii, by country. We present only the 
models that fit the data the best for each country, as identified by Sologon and O'Donoghue 
(2009; 2009)s. The estimation results are illustrated in Table 5. Following Dickens (2000), all 
variances are restricted to be positive by estimating the variance equal to the exponent of the 
parameter. The reported variance estimates in Table 5 represent the exponent of the parameter 
and the reported standard errors correspond to the parameter estimates. 
The  formulation  of  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  of  earnings  differs  between 
countries.  
Permanent component 
In  Germany,  Netherlands,  UK,  Ireland,  Italy,  Greece,  Spain  and  Finland,  the  permanent 
component follows a random growth model with time and cohort specific loading factors. The 
estimated  coefficients  for  the  permanent  component  of  earnings  show  that  time-invariant 
heterogeneity and age-earning profile heterogeneity plays a significant role in the formation of 
long-term earnings differentials in all these countries. Individual specific heterogeneity plays the 
highest role in Germany, followed by Spain, Netherlands, Greece, UK, Ireland and Italy, which 
suggests that in Germany there is a higher dispersion in the time-invariant individual specific 
attributes that determine wage differentials. 44 
 
The  estimated  random  slope  variance  implies  that  hourly  earnings  growth  for  an  individual 
located one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of φ is the largest in Germany, 
where  it  is  with  4.89%
xiii  faster  than  the  cohort  mean,  followed  by  Greece,  Ireland,  Spain, 
Netherlands, UK and Finland with rates between 1% and 1.41% and Italy with 0.89%. All these 
countries have a negative covariance between the time invariant individual specific effect and the 
individual specific slope of the age-earning profile, which implies that the initial and lifecycle 
heterogeneity are negatively associated. This negative association corresponds to the trade-off 
between earnings early in the career and subsequent earnings growth and is consistent with the 
on-the-job training hypothesis (Mincer, 1974). Therefore, this suggests the presence of mobility 
within the distribution of permanent earnings over the sample period. These findings reinforce 
the results from previous studies.  
Therefore for these countries the evolution of the permanent component without the time loading 
factors  could  be  either  increasing  or  decreasing.  The  time-specific  loading  factors  for  the 
permanent component are highly significant with values close to 1 in all countries. The trends of 
the returns to the permanent component vary to a large extent across countries. One common 
feature is that they reflect, as was emphasized before, trends in the high-order autocovariances in 
the data. These estimates show that overall, controlling for age and cohort effects, the returns to 
skills decreased over the sample period in Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
increased in Germany and Finland. The trends over one year intervals differ between countries, 
some  records  a  smooth  evolution,  others  noisier.  For  example,  Netherlands  experienced 
decreases in returns almost every second year. In UK, the returns increased in 1997 and 2001 and 
decreased in the rest. Ireland recorded a decrease until 1996, a boost in 1997 and a clear decline 
thereafter. In Italy, 1998 and 1999 appear to be years with increases in return to skills, in Greece 45 
 
every second year, in Spain 1996 and 1998. Germany experienced increasing returns to human 
capital until 2000, and Finland in 1997 and 2001. Therefore, in these years, the relative position 
of the highly skilled individuals was enhanced.  
In  Denmark  the  permanent  component  follows  a  random  walk  in  age.  The  variance  of  the 
innovation in the random walk is significantly larger than zero. As the variance of a variable that 
follows a random walk is the sum of the variances of the innovation term, this finding implies 
that permanent inequality increases over lifetime. In Denmark, the variance at the age of 20 is 
higher than the variance at subsequent ages, suggesting the presence of larger permanent shocks 
at younger ages, which is consistent with matching models, in which the information revealed 
about a worker’s ability increases with time. The final trend in the permanent variance depends 
on the period specific  loading  factors, which reveal that overall, the relative position of the 
highly skilled individuals decreased over the sample period in Denmark. The yearly evolution 
revealed a smooth decrease until 2000, followed by a small increase in 2001. 
In Belgium,  France,  Luxembourg, Portugal and  Austria the persistent dispersion of earnings 
follows the canonical  model, where the permanent component  is time-invariant. The highest 
variance  in  the  time  invariant  characteristics  is  recorded  in  Portugal,  followed  by  France, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium. In this case, the time-specific loading factors determine the 
final trend of the permanent differentials: they decreased in Belgium and Austria, and increased 
in France, Luxembourg and Portugal. With respect to the yearly evolution, France records an 
increase in the returns to skills until 1997 and again in 2001, Luxembourg until 2000, Belgium in 
1995 and 2001, Austria during most of the period, except 1998-1999, and Portugal in 1996 and 
1998. 46 
 
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the permanent earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. However, the trends suggested by these estimates differ between countries. The 
permanent component of earnings appears to increase over the life cycle in Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Austria. In Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain the permanent 
component  of  earnings  has  an  inverted-U  shape  evolution  over  the  life  cycle.  These  trends 
confirm the expectation that permanent earnings differentials play  a  much  larger role  in the 
formation of overall earnings differentials of older cohorts compared with younger ones, which 
experience higher earnings volatility due to temporary contracts. We expect the opposite to hold 
in the case of cohort-specific shifters for transitory earnings.  
The permanent component of earnings appears to decrease over the life cycle in UK, Ireland, 
Italy,  Greece  and  Finland.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  younger  cohorts  have  more 
heterogeneous  skills.  Another  explanation  is  that  younger  cohorts  might  experience  larger 
permanent shocks even if they do not have a larger dispersion of skills. This could be the case if 
the labour market has become tougher over time, such as in the case of the Italian labour market, 
which is characterised by high rates of youth unemployment.  
Transitory component 
The formulation of the temporary component of earnings differs between countries. It follows an 
AR(1) process with time and cohorts loading factors in all countries, except for Italy, Greece and 
Spain,  where  it  follows  an  ARMA(1,1).  Except  for  Spain,  Portugal  and  Austria,  where  all 
cohorts share the same initial conditions, the other countries are characterized by heteroskedastic 
initial conditions. The estimated coefficients for the transitory component of earnings are all 
significant,  suggesting  that  the  initial  variance(s),  the  AR(1)  process,  respectively  the 47 
 
ARMA(1,1) process and the time and cohort loading factors contribute significantly to earnings 
volatility in all countries.  
The variance of initial conditions, which represents the accumulation of shocks up to the starting 
year of the panel, is smaller than that of subsequent shocks in all countries. However, the pattern 
of the heteroskedstic initial conditions differs between countries. In Denmark, Luxembourg, UK, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Finland  it  follows  the  inverted-U  shape:  the  variance  of  initial 
conditions increases over the lifecycle and decreases at the end. The opposite holds for France, 
where the oldest and the youngest cohorts have the highest initial variances.  
In  Germany,  Netherlands  and  Finland  the  pattern  of  the  heteroskedstic  initial  conditions 
illustrates a general decreasing trend over the lifecycle, suggesting that the initial variance plays 
a larger role in the formation of earnings differentials for the youngest cohort compared with the 
oldest. In Belgium the reverse holds: the heteroskedastic cohort initial conditions appear to play 
the largest role in the formation of earnings differentials for the oldest cohort and the smallest for 
the youngest cohort.  
The magnitude of the autoregressive parameter varies between countries. A large autoregressive 
parameter, which suggests that shocks are persistent, is recorded in Spain with 26.9% of a shock 
still  present  after  8  years,  in  Portugal  with  8.5%  and  in  Austria  with  5.7%.  A  moderate 
autoregressive parameter suggesting that shocks die out rather quickly is recorded in Italy with 
2.8% of a shock still present after 8 years, in Belgium with 2.4%, and in Greece with 1.4%. A 
very small autoregressive parameter is present in Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, 
Germany,  France,  UK  and  Denmark,  where  between  0.0008%  and  0.8%  of  a  shock  is  still 
present after 8 years. The negative sign of the MA component implies that the autocovariances 48 
 
decline sharply over the first period, confirming the trends observed in the previous section for 
Italy, Greece and Spain.
xiv 
The time-specific loading factors for the transitory component are highly significant and display 
a higher variation than for the permanent component in all countries. The trends of the transitory 
inequality vary to a large extent across countries. These estimates show that overall the transitory 
variance decreased over the sample period in Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
UK, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland. It increased in Luxembourg and Ireland.  
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the transitory earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the temporary component indicate 
that earnings volatility appears to be higher for younger cohorts, thus confirming the pattern 
observed  in  the  dynamic  description  of  the  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings,  where 
autocovariances were found to be lower for younger cohorts. This result is expected, given that 
younger people experience in general more frequent job changes, and consequently less stable 
earnings.  
6.2. Inequality Decomposition into Permanent and Transitory Inequality 
Having estimated a suitable error component model for earnings in each country, next we use 
these parameters estimates to decompose the variance-covariance structure of earnings into its 
permanent  and  transitory  components,  assess  their  relative  importance  and  analyse  their 
contribution to the evolution of the overall inequality over the sample period. Basically, we want 
to assess which is the component that plays the largest role in the declining/rising overall cross-
sectional inequality between 1994 and 2001.  
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Following Sologon & O’Donoghue (2009), the absolute decomposition of the variance, together 
with the actual and predicted variance of earnings by cohort are presented in Figure 5.  
For all countries, the evolution of the predicted variance follows closely the evolution of the 
actual variance, which is not surprising given the high fit of the models indicated by the very low 
sum of square residuals. Earnings inequality measured by the actual variance decreased overall 
in Germany, except for the cohorts born in 1941-1950 and 1961-1970 where it increased; in 
Denmark; in Belgium, except for the youngest cohort where it increased; in France, except for 
the cohort born in 1961-1970; in UK, except for the youngest two cohorts where it increased; in 
Ireland; in Spain except the youngest cohort, and in Austria. Earnings inequality measured by the 
actual  variance  increased  overall  for  all  cohorts  in  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Greece, 
Portugal and Finland, except the youngest cohort. These are countries where wages appear to be 
more responsive to market forces.  
In  1994,  the  highest  average  permanent  inequality
xv  was  recorded  in  Portugal  and  Spain, 
followed by France, Ireland, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. 
The highest transitory variance was recorded in France, Ireland, Greece, UK, Germany, Spain, 
Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Portugal.  
In 2001 the rankings looks slightly different. Portugal records the highest average permanent 
differentials,  followed  by  Luxembourg,  France,  Spain,  Ireland,  Germany,  Greece,  UK,  Italy, 
Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Denmark. In terms of transitory inequality, Portugal 
appears  to  be  the  most  dispersed,  followed  by  Spain,  Netherlands,  France,  Greece,  UK, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Italy.  
The decrease in overall cross-sectional inequality appears to be the result of decreasing both 
permanent  and  transitory  differentials  in  Denmark  and  Austria,  of  decreasing  permanent 50 
 
differentials with offsetting effect over the  increasing transitory differentials  in Belgium and 
Spain,  and  of  decreasing  transitory  differentials  with  offsetting  effects  over  the  increasing 
permanent differentials in Germany, France, UK and Ireland. In most countries, these trends are 
consistent  across  cohorts.  Mixed  trends  are  observed  in  Belgium,  where  the  oldest  cohort 
recorded an increase in transitory variance, in Germany, where the oldest cohort recorded an 
increase in transitory differentials and the second oldest a decrease in permanent differentials; in 
UK, where the oldest experienced a decrease in permanent differentials and the youngest an 
increase in transitory differentials; in Ireland, where the oldest cohort experienced a decrease in 
permanent variance. 
In Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Finland, the exacerbation of permanent differentials, meaning 
the increase in returns to skills was the dominant factor behind the increase in overall inequality, 
offsetting  the  decrease  in  transitory  differentials,  whereas  in  Portugal  and  Netherlands  both 
components increased. These trends are consistent across cohorts, except for Luxembourg and 
Greece, where the youngest, respectively the second oldest recorded an increase in transitory 
differentials,  and  Finland  and  Netherlands  where  permanent  differentials  decrease  for  the 
youngest cohort.  
To sum up so far, the decrease in overall inequality was driven by a decrease in both components 
in Denmark and Austria, by a decrease in permanent differentials in Belgium and Spain and by a 
decrease in transitory differentials in Germany, France, UK and Ireland. The exacerbation of 
overall inequality appears to be the result of increasing permanent differentials in Luxembourg, 
Italy, Greece and Finland, and of an increase in both components in Portugal and Netherlands. 
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Further, we look at the evolution of the structure of inequality. For a full description, please refer 
to Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009). The main findings are summarized below.  
The pattern of decomposition of the overall variance was found to vary between cohorts and 
countries. However, some common traits emerge. Inequality  in the permanent component of 
earnings appears to account for a higher share of the overall variance the older the cohort is, 
which is consistent with the evidence of lifecycle earnings divergence showing that older cohorts 
experience a lower earnings volatility compared with younger cohorts. Moreover, inequality in 
the temporary component of earnings accounts for the highest share for the youngest cohort, 
which reinforces the expectation that earnings volatility is higher at younger ages. 
A yearly summary of the evolution of the structure of inequality is offered in Figure 6 which 
illustrates the degree of immobility for each cohort, measured by the ratio between permanent 
and transitory differentials. Basically, an increase in the immobility ratio indicates a decrease in 
mobility,  equivalent  with  an  increase  in  the  share  of  the  permanent  differentials  in  overall 
inequality. 
For all countries, mobility appears to be higher for younger cohorts compared with older cohorts. 
The evolution of the immobility ratio has a similar trend for the oldest three cohorts, whereas for 
the youngest the slope is much less noisy, suggesting that labour market policy and institutional 
factors have a much smaller impact on earnings mobility for the youngest participants in the 
labour market. The most similar immobility rates between the young and the old are recorded in 
Denmark, Finland and Greece.  
Mobility decreased in Germany, France, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Austria and 
Finland. This trend is consistent across cohorts, except for the oldest cohort in Germany and the 52 
 
youngest  cohort  in  UK,  where  the  share  of  the  permanent  component  decreased,  thereby 
enhancing mobility. 
Mobility increased in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Netherlands and only slightly in Denmark. 
This holds from most cohorts, except for the oldest and second youngest cohort in Denmark and 
for the oldest in Belgium, where mobility decreased as a result of an increase in the share of the 
permanent component. 
To sum up the overall trends, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an 
increase in mobility in Denmark, Belgium and Spain, where mobility helped individuals improve 
significantly their position  in permanent earnings distribution, and  by  a decrease  in earnings 
mobility in Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria,, where mobility cannot be considered 
among the driving forces behind the decrease in overall inequality.  
The increase in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an increase in mobility, sign of 
increased volatility in Netherlands and by a decrease in mobility in Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, and Finland.  
The  overall  evolution  of  the  structure  of  inequality  for  countries  that  recorded  an  increase, 
respectively a decrease in overall inequality over the sample period is summarized in Table 6.  
However, these trends in the structure of inequality were not monotonic, as can be observed in 
Figure 6. For Denmark and Spain, a turnaround is observed around 1998-1999, when mobility 
started increasing, following the increase over the period 1994-1998. For Denmark, 1998 was a 
year which marked the end of a period of continuous economic growth which had begun in 1993. 
(EIROnline) In Spain, 1999 marked the year of the approval of the National Action Plan and of 
the reform of Spanish legislation on temporary employment agencies, which improved the pay 53 
 
for temporary workers. (EIROnline) In Belgium, the adoption of the NAP took place around 
1999-2000. (EIROnline). 
In France, a significant change appears to occur after 1996, when mobility started to increase. 
This might be explained by the rapid increase in employment which occurred in France between 
1997 and 2002 as a result of the policies aimed to lower the cost of unskilled jobs and stimulate 
job creation. In Ireland, the significant turnaround, which occurred in 1997, might be due to the 
slowing  down  of  the  Celtic  Tiger:  the  remarkable  economic  growth  which  started  in  1994 
favoured the rise  in the  share of permanent  inequality, which contracted slightly after 1997. 
Hence, the economic growth was a shock that accentuated the share of permanent differentials 
between individuals and reduced earnings mobility between 1994 and 1997. After 1997, mobility 
increased. 
A dramatic change occurred in Austria after 1998. Until 1998, the share of permanent inequality 
increased sharply and was accompanied by a large drop in wage mobility. During 1999, Austria 
has  experienced  a  considerable  rise  in  employment  and  a  further  decline  in  unemployment, 
which was the effect of the labour market initiatives pursued by the Austrian Government. This 
explains the increase in inequality after 1999: higher employment is usually accompanied by 
higher inequality. These measures appear to have reduced the share of permanent inequality in 
1999, which stabilized thereafter.  
In  Netherlands,  a  significant  changed  occurred  after  1998,  when  the  share  of  permanent 
inequality started decreasing and offset the increasing trend which dominated the period before 
1998. Among the important issued addressed by the labour market legislation in 1998 were part-
time employment, labour market flexibility and active labour market policies. In 2001, the share 54 
 
of the permanent components is the lowest among all countries which recorded an increase in 
overall inequality.  
For Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Finland, a turning point occurred around 1998-
1999.  This  period  coincides  with  the  approval  of  the  National  Action  plan  for  employment 
aimed, among others, to lower labour cost, promote active labour market policies, training and 
increase  labour  market  flexibility.  This  appears  to  have  affected  the  structure  of  wage 
differentials to a large extent. Immediately after 1998-1999, the share of permanent inequality 
started to decrease, and consequently mobility started to increase.  
These measures affected the ranking in average immobility
xvi, as illustrated in Figure 7. In 1994, 
Denmark  was  the  most  mobile,  followed  by  Greece,  Belgium,  France,  Netherlands,  Ireland, 
Italy,  UK,  Germany,  Spain  and  Portugal.  In  2001,  Denmark  has  still  the  highest  earnings 
mobility,  followed  by  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Spain,  Greece,  Finland,  UK,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  Portugal,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg.  As  expected,  countries  with  the  lowest 
mobility are among the countries with the highest permanent differentials.  
7.  LINKING POLICY WITH OUTCOMES 
What are the factors explaining country heterogeneity in the level and the evolution of permanent 
differentials, transitory differentials and earnings mobility? We try to explain the differences in 
these labour market outcomes across countries by relating to the differences in the wage setting 
mechanism  and  other  labour  marker  institutions  and  policies,  such  as  active  labour  market 
policies and income maintenance institutions (e.g. unemployment benefits); and institutional and 
policy  changes,  such  as  employment  protection  legislation,  product  market  regulation,  tax 
wedge, unionization. 55 
 
First we describe with the naked eye the possible associations that can be formed between the 
trends in the labour market outcomes identified in Section 6.2.1 (see Figure 5) and Section 6.2.2 
(Figure  6  and  Figure  7)  and  changes  in  the  labour  market  policy  and  institutional  factors 
identified in Section 5.2 and summarized in Figure 3. 
Second, by cohorts, we estimate uncontrolled pairwise correlations to put some numbers on the 
observed trends and see whether the relationships differ by cohorts. Finally, using non-linear 
least squares, we attempt to estimate the complex relationship between the institutional factors 
and permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility. 
7.1.Explaining the changes and differences 
First, we start with the rankings in average permanent and transitory differentials and average 
mobility  observed  in  1994  and  2001  (see  Section  6.2.1).  At  a  first  glance,  the  diverging 
characteristics of the labour markets (see Figure 3) recording the highest and the lowest average 
permanent differentials – Portugal and Denmark -, suggest that permanent variance appears to be 
positively  associated  with  employment  protection  legislation  (EPL),  employment  protection 
legislation  for  regular  contracts  (EPLR),  employment  protection  legislation  (employment 
protection legislation for temporary contracts) EPLT, the relative difference between the EPLR 
and EPLT, and (product market regulation) PMR and negatively associated with union density, 
the degree of corporatism, the tax wedge, the generosity of the unemployment benefit and the 
level of spending for active labour market policies (ALMPs).  
Similarly, temporary variance appears to be positively associated with EPLT, the unemployment 
benefit generosity, and negatively with union density, PMR and the degree of corporatism.  56 
 
Looking at the labour markets with the highest and lowest average immobility in 1994 and 2001 
(Figure 7), a positive association was found with union density, tax wedge and unemployment 
benefit, and a negative association with EPLR, the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT, 
and PMR. For the other factors the trend is less clear-cut. 
Next, we try to link the evolution of the three labour market outcomes (Figure 5 and Figure 6) 
with the evolution of the institutional factors summarized in Figure 3.  
The  common  factors  that  might  explain  the  common  trends  in  permanent  differentials  and 
mobility in Denmark, Belgium and Spain are the decrease in EPL, the increase in ALMP and the 
decrease in PMR. ALMP can reduce permanent and transitory differentials by improving the 
efficiency of the job matching process and by enhancing the skills of the unemployed. Moreover 
its effects are expected to be enhanced when they are coupled with a low or decreasing EPL. 
Denmark represents a proof of the efficiency of this mix in reducing both components.  
The ALMP–EPL mix might also be one of the factors explaining the divergence in the transitory 
variance trends between these countries: Denmark exhibits a high ALMP coupled with a low 
EPL, whereas the other two exhibit a relatively low ALMP coupled with a medium high EPL. 
This suggests that the impact of ALMP on transitory inequality might decrease with the EPL. A 
second factor could be the interaction between the decrease in PMR and the other factors. Lower 
PMRs are expected to determine an increase in both components. However, these effects appear 
to be completely offset in Denmark, whereas in Belgium and Spain they are offset only for 
permanent differentials.  
Third, the decrease in transitory variance in Denmark might signal the presence of strong wage 
bargaining structures, finding supported by the high union density, corporatism and bargaining 
coverage indicators. This is consistent with the OECD (2004) results, which placed Denmark as 57 
 
having  one  of  the  highest  collective  bargaining  and  trade  union  density  among  all  14  EU 
countries under analysis. In Belgium and Spain, another potential factor explaining the increase 
in transitory inequality might be immigration, which increased considerably with the expansion 
of the European Union. 
To sum up, the outstanding performance of the  labour  market in Denmark which assured a 
decreasing cross-sectional inequality by reducing both components, might be due to the so called 
“flexicurity  approach”  (OECD(2004)),  which  represents  an  interesting  combination  of  high 
labour market dynamism and relatively high social protection. It is a mix of flexibility (a high 
degree of job mobility thanks to low EPL), social security (a generous system of unemployment 
benefits)  and  active  labour  market  programmes,  which  allows  individuals  to  improve  their 
position  in  the  permanent  income  distribution  by  reducing  permanent  income  differentials, 
maintain at the same time a low degree of earnings volatility.  
The common factors that might explain the decrease in transitory differentials and the decrease 
in mobility in Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria are the decrease in union density and 
PMR, the increase in ALMP and the low EPL which was roughly constant, except for Germany 
where the latter two factors decreased. The decrease in union density and PMR are potential 
factors explaining the increase in permanent differentials in Germany, France, UK and Ireland, 
which  appear  to  have  offset  the  effect  of  the  increase  in  ALMP  present  in  the  latter  three 
countries. UK, Ireland and Austria exhibit another factor with a potential increasing effect on 
permanent differentials: the decrease in the tax wedge.  
The  decrease  in  transitory  variance,  which  is  common  to  all  these  countries,  reinforces  the 
finding that developed increasing ALMP coupled with a relatively low EPL can be expected to 
dampen earnings volatility. Hence, for transitory differentials, the impact of the ALMP-EPL mix 58 
 
appears to have offset the potential effects of the decrease in union density and PMR. Moreover, 
the  dampening  effect  of  the  ALMP-EPL  mix  on  the  transitory  inequality  appears  to  be 
accentuated when it is coupled with an increase in the unemployment benefit generosity. It is the 
case in France, Ireland and Austria. 
In  France,  other  factors  which  might  contribute  to  the  absolute  increase  in  the  permanent 
component are the increase in EPLR, because of the potential reducing effect on the incidence of 
permanent contracts. The decrease  in transitory inequality  might also signal a  labour market 
mechanism put in place to reduce transitory inequality. This is consistent with OECD (2004): 
France ranks the lowest on union density, but managed to increase coverage levels after the 
introduction of the legislation promoting collective bargaining and is now among the countries 
with the highest coverage rates of 90% and above, together with Austria, Belgium and Finland. 
Moreover, based on OECD (2004), France was  found to have a  low  level of  labour  market 
dynamics, which might explain the reduction in transitory inequality and mobility.  
In UK, the positive increasing relative difference between EPLR and EPLT, coupled with the 
low  degree  of  corporatism  could  have  accentuated  the  disincentive  for  employers  to  train 
temporary workers, and thus could have contribute to increase permanent differentials. 
In Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Finland and Portugal, the common institutional trends that might 
explain the increase in permanent differentials and the decrease in mobility are the decrease or 
constant evolution of the EPL, the decrease in union density, PMR and the tax wedge. Italy and 
Portugal exhibit also a decrease in EPLT relative to EPLR, which might accentuate permanent 
differentials. The decrease in transitory differentials might be explained by the increase in the 
ALMP, coupled with the increase in the generosity of the unemployment benefit, except for 
Finland. The divergence in transitory differentials recorded by Portugal might be due to the level 59 
 
of  corporatism:  an  intermediate  level  appears  to  accentuate  transitory  differentials  (Italy), 
whereas a high level might help to reduce them. 
The difference in permanent and transitory inequality, and mobility trends observed between 
cohorts (Figure 5 and Figure 6) might be due to the different level of responsiveness to the 
macroeconomic  shocks  and  their  interactions  with  the  other  labour  market  policy  and 
institutional factors. Younger workers are expected to be affected to a larger extent by these 
shocks, compared with experienced workers, with a high attachment to the labour market and a 
better protection from the institutional framework. This might be another explanation for the 
much higher share of transitory inequality observed for younger cohorts.  
Moreover, we can expect institutional factors to play a much larger role in shaping permanent 
differentials compared with transitory differentials and earnings mobility, given that the latter 
two are exposed to a much larger extent to random shocks, for which institutional factors might 
have a delayed response or any at all. 
For example, comparing the evolution of the two components in Figure 5 with the evolution of 
the supply and demand shocks in Figure 4, it seems that transitory differentials are influenced 
positively by supply shocks, whereas permanent differentials appear to be negatively influenced 
by demand shocks in the short run, but positively in long run. However, the responsiveness of 
the two components depends on the other factors. In some countries, such as UK, characterized 
by a low degree of corporatism, medium low union density, low EPL, the responsiveness of the 
transitory component is high. Moreover, the decrease in union density appears to affect the most 
the  youngest  cohort:  its  transitory  variance  increased  over  time,  diverging  from  the  trends 
observed  for the other cohorts. The  increase  in  permanent differentials  for the oldest cohort 
might be due to the increase in the ALMP, in the context of the very low EPL.  60 
 
In Belgium, which has a high degree of corporatism and a medium high union density and EPL, 
transitory variance appears to evolve opposite to supply shocks, both short and long term. The 
link  between  permanent  variance  and  demand  shocks  appears  to  be  positive  short term  and 
negative long term. 
Given these trends, we expect institutional factors to shape the pattern and level of permanent 
inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility not only directly, but also in interaction 
with  macroeconomic  shocks.  The  overall  institutional  factors  is  expected  to  be  a  “filtering 
mechanism”  for the adverse effect that these  shocks  might have on the three  labour  market 
outcomes, provided that their aim is indeed to keep permanent and transitory inequality low, 
assuring at the same time that low wage individuals are not trapped in low pay, but have the 
opportunity to improve their position  in the distribution of  lifetime  income through earnings 
mobility. 
7.2.Correlations 
Given the clear distinction in the trends of the two components and earnings immobility between 
the oldest three cohort and the youngest cohorts, we expect that that also the underlying factors 
to  differ  to  a  certain  extent.  Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  account  for  cohort  heterogeneity  when 
analysing the link between the three labour market outcomes and the institutional factors.  
To  begin  with,  we  compute  the  simple  uncontrolled  correlations  (Table  7)  comparatively 
between the oldest there cohorts, polled together, and the youngest one.  
The associations between permanent variance and the ten labour market policy and institutional 
factors are significant at 5% level of confidence, except for employment protection legislation 
for  regular  contracts  (EPLR)  for  the  youngest  cohort.  Discrepancies  between  cohorts  with 61 
 
respect to permanent variance are recorded for the employment protection legislation factors: for 
the  oldest  cohorts  permanent  variance  appears  to  be  positively  associated  with  EPL,  EPLT, 
EPLR, whereas for the youngest the opposite holds. For the other factors the associations are 
consistent across cohorts: a positive relationship is found with the relative difference between 
EPLR and EPLT, and with product market regulation (PMR), whereas a negative one is found 
with union density, the degree of corporatism, tax wedge, active labour market policies (ALMP) 
and unemployment befit replacement rate. 
For  transitory  variance,  divergence  between  cohorts  are  found  for  the  relative  difference  in 
regulation,  which  reports  a  positive  association  for  older  cohorts,  tax  wedge,  ALMP  and 
unemployment benefit replacement rate, which report a negative association for older cohorts. 
For all cohorts, EPL, EPLR, EPLT, PMR, appear to be positively associated with transitory 
variance, whereas union density and the degree of corporatism report a negative association.  
For Immobility, the same  factors diverge  between  cohorts: EPL, EPLR and EPLT exhibit  a 
negative association for the youngest cohorts and a positive one for the rest. The rest of the 
association are similar as for permanent variance. 
Regarding  the  correlations  with  the  macroeconomic  shocks,  some  differences  do  emerge 
between cohorts.  
For permanent variance, the youngest cohort records a much stronger positive correlation with 
labour  demand  shocks  compared  with  older  cohorts.  The  situation  is  reversed  for  the  other 
shocks, which appear to be negatively correlated with the permanent variance for older cohort 
and insignificant for the youngest.  62 
 
For transitory variance, only total factor production factor and aggregate demand shocks exhibit 
a significant negative association. Compared between cohorts, the negative association with total 
factor production shock appears to be stronger for the older cohorts, whereas for the other shock 
they appear to be the same. More differences between cohorts emerge for earnings immobility, 
which appears to be associated positively with labour demand shock and negatively with real 
interest shock for the youngest cohort, and insignificant for older cohort. Terms of trade shock 
exhibits a small positive correlation for older cohorts and a similar but insignificant association 
for the youngest.  
Nevertheless,  these  correlations  are  far  from  telling  the  true  story  given  that  the  complex 
interactions that take place between institutions on the one hand, and between institutions and 
macroeconomic shocks on the other hand, is expected to change significantly the overall impact 
of each of these factors on the three labour market outcomes. 
7.3.Estimation 
This section aims to provide some empirical evidence with respect to the impact of the main 
labour  market  policy  and  institutional  factors  and  their  complex  interactions  in  shaping 
permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility.  
7.3.1.  Systemic interactions: do policies and institutions interact with the overall 
institutional framework? 
The results regarding systematic interactions are included in Table 8. The models with systemic 
interactions are estimated to explain 97.8% of the overall cross-country variance of permanent 
inequality changes, 93.7% of transitory inequality changes and 73.7% of earnings immobility 
changes between 1994 and 2001.  63 
 
The cohorts shifters are  highly significant  in all  models, confirming the cohort-heterogenous 
trends identified previously by the error component model and summarized in Figure 5, Section 
6.2.2 and Figure 6: the older the cohort, the higher the impact of permanent variance, the lower 
the impact transitory inequality and the higher the impact of wage immobility.  
Similarly, the time effects are highly significant in all models. They indicate that, overall, at the 
EU level, controlling for the effects of institutional and policy factors, the unobserved shocks had 
a  decreasing  impact  on  permanent  variance  in  1995,  an  increasing  impact  until  1997  and 
decreasing impact thereafter. The impact of unobserved shocks on transitory inequality appears 
to  decrease  over  the  entire  period,  whereas  for  wage  immobility  it  was  not  monotonic:  it 
decreased in 1995, increased until 1997, decreased until 1999, increased again in 2000, followed 
by  a  drop  in  2001.  Overall,  it  appears  that  unobserved  shocks  had  negative  effect  on  both 
permanent and transitory dispersion, and a positive effect on wage mobility.  
The direct effects, controlling for systemic interactions, indicate that, except for product market 
regulation  (PMR)  and  active  labour  market  policies  (ALMPs),  all  other  variable  have  a 
significant  impact  on  permanent  dispersion.  Factors  that  appear  to  work  towards  reducing 
permanent  inequality  are a high union density  and a  high unemployment benefit. The hump 
shape profile of the impact of the degree of corporatism is confirmed: the intermediate level of 
corporatism  appears  to  trigger  the  highest  permanent  dispersion,  followed  by  high  and  low 
corporatism. 
The systemic interaction effects for union density, the degree of corporatism, tax wedge and 
PMR provide evidence of reform complementarity in reducing permanent inequality. Hence the 
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the reducing impact of a high union density, an intermediate and high degree of corporatism, a 
high tax wedge and a high PMR. 
The model for transitory variance, in spite of having a similar level of explained variation as the 
model for permanent inequality, exhibits a smaller number of significant effects. This might be 
due to the period unobserved shocks and cohort effects, which are expected to explain to a large 
extent  the  evolution  in  transitory  inequality.  Random  exogenous  shocks  increase  earnings 
variability and the magnitude of their expected impact depends on the specific lifecycle stage a 
respective cohort is in.  
For transitory variance, only PMR, ALMPs and unemployment benefit replacement rate have a 
significant  direct  impact.  An  increase  in  the  spending  for  ALMPs  and  an  increase  in  the 
unemployment benefit replacement appear to work towards increasing transitory differentials, 
whereas an increase in PMR appears to reduce permanent differentials. Moreover, the higher the 
union  density  and  the  higher  the  degree  of  corporatism  are,  the  larger  is  the  reduction  in 
transitory variance. However, these effects are not significant at conventional levels.  
The  systemic  interactions  for  transitory  inequality  indicate  a  reform  complementarity  for 
reducing transitory inequality between the overall framework and union density and the degree 
of corporatism. Hence, the more inclined the overall framework is towards reducing transitory 
differentials, the effect is larger the higher in the union density and the larger is the degree of 
corporatism. However, the effect of union density is not significant at conventional levels. The 
other factors appear to counteract with the overall system, but the effect is significant only for 
the unemployment benefit replacement rate, which appears to work towards increasing transitory 
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For earnings immobility, a significant positive direct effect is found for employment protection 
legislation (EPL), the relative difference between employment protection legislation for regular 
contracts (EPLR) and temporary contracts (EPLT), a high degree of corporatism and ALMPs. 
Similarly for PMR, but the effect is not significant. A U-shaped profile is found for the degree of 
corporatism: a high degree of corporatism is found to increase wage immobility compared with 
low  corporatism,  whereas  an  intermediate  corporatism  appears  to  decrease  it.  Besides 
intermediate levels of corporatism, other factors that appear to contribute directly to enhance 
earnings mobility are the union density and the unemployment benefit replacement rate.  
The systemic interactions suggest that there is a complementarity in reducing wage immobility 
between the overall framework, union density and high and intermediate levels of corporatism. 
Tax  wedge  appears  to  have  a  similar  effect,  but  not  significant.  PMR  and  ALMPs,  when 
interacted with the overall framework, appear to increase wage immobility.  
7.3.2.  Specific Interactions 
This section explores the specific interactions between institutions and between institutions and 
shocks which are expected to shape the pattern of permanent inequality, transitory inequality and 
earnings  mobility.  First  we  look  only  at  direct  effect  of  shocks  and  institutions  and  their 
interactions. Second, we enhance the model by adding cross-interactions between institutions 
and other controls.  
Table 9 illustrates the estimates for the direct effects of institutions, shocks and the interactions 
between the two. The models manage to explain 97.9% of the variation in permanent inequality, 
92.9% of the variation in the transitory inequality and 68.9% of the variation in wage immobility. 
These results indicate that these shocks affect the three labour market outcomes not only directly, 
but also indirectly, through their interactions with the institutional and policy factors.  66 
 
As expected, permanent inequality appears to be affected directly by these shocks to a much 
lesser extent compared with transitory inequality and wage immobility. For transitory inequality 
all shocks show a highly  significant effect, for wage  immobility all except aggregate labour 
supply, whereas for permanent inequality only the terms of trade shock and aggregate demand 
appear to have a negative significant direct effect. Transitory inequality appears to be affected 
positively by the aggregate supply, terms of trade and the total factor production shocks, and 
negatively  by the rest. Wage  immobility  is affected negatively  by aggregate demand,  labour 
demand and the interest rate shock, and positively by the rest.  
The  explanation  for  the  lack  of  significance  of  the  direct  effects  of  shock  in  explaining 
permanent inequality is found in the interaction effects. All interaction effects are significant, 
except for ALMPs, suggesting that indeed these policies and institution filter out the effects of 
these shocks. EPL, the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT and the tax wedge have a 
positive  significant  effect  on  permanent  variance,  which  appears  to  be  amplified  under  the 
aggregate  impact  of  these  shocks.  The  positive  significant  effect  of  ALMPs  appears  to  be 
diminished under the impact of aggregate shocks, but the interaction term is not significant at 
conventional levels.  
If  for  directs  effects  the  hump-shaped  pattern  of  the  relationship  between  the  degree  of 
corporatism and permanent inequality is confirmed, with the high level triggering the lowest 
permanent  inequality,  followed  by  low  and  intermediate  corporatism,  in  interaction  with 
aggregate  shocks  the  degree  of  corporatism  clearly  becomes  a  tool  for  reducing  permanent 
differentials. The higher is the degree of corporatism, the larger is the magnitude of the negative 
impact  in  reducing  permanent  inequality.  Other  factors,  such  as  union  density,  PMR  and 
unemployment benefit replacement rate, have a negative yet insignificant direct effect, but in 67 
 
interaction  with  aggregate  shocks  they  appear  to  work  significantly  towards  increasing 
permanent differentials. 
For transitory inequality fewer factors appear to be significant in filtering out the effects of shock 
compared with permanent inequality and wage immobility. The direct effect for intermediate 
corporatism  appears  to  trigger  the  highest  transitory  inequality,  followed  by  high  and  low 
corporatism. However, in interaction with the aggregate shocks, its impact becomes negative but 
insignificant,  whereas  for  high  corporatism  it  becomes  negative  and  highly  significant.  This 
suggests that, similarly as for permanent inequality, a high corporatism appears to be an efficient 
tool  for  reducing  or  limiting  the  increase  of  transitory  inequality  under  in  the  impact  of 
macroeconomic shocks. Similarly for unemployment benefit replacement rate: a more generous 
benefit appears to have a significant positive impact on transitory inequality, but in interaction 
with macroeconomic shocks it becomes negative and significant.  
Tax wedge does not appear to have a significant direct effect on transitory inequality, but in 
interaction with macroeconomic shocks, it appears to be an efficient tool in reducing or limiting 
the increase of transitory inequality under the impact of macroeconomic shocks. The opposite 
holds  for  PMR  and  ALMPs:  they  have  a  negative  direct  effect,  but  in  interaction  with 
macroeconomic shocks, they appear to have a positive impact on transitory inequality.  
Wage  immobility  appears  to  be  explained  to  a  much  lesser  extent  by  the  direct  effects  of 
institutions compared with permanent and transitory inequality. However, most of the indirect 
effects  are  highly  significant,  which  suggests  that  wage  immobility  is  influenced  mainly  by 
macroeconomic shocks and their interaction with the institutional setting. The only factors with a 
significant direct effect are the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT and unemployment 
benefit  generosity,  which  appear  to  increase  wage  immobility.  However,  in  interaction  with 68 
 
shocks, their effects turn negative. The effect of macroeconomic shocks on wage immobility 
appear to increase significantly with EPL, union density, PMR and ALMPs, and to decrease with 
tax  wedge,  unemployment  benefit  replacement  rate  and  the  degree  of  corporatism.  For 
corporatism, an intermediate level appears to be the most effective in reducing the impact of 
shocks, followed by high and low corporatism.  
In order to grasp more in depth the nature of the relationship between institutions and shocks, 
these  models  are  augmented  by  including  also  2-by-2  interactions  between  the  institutional 
factors, and other controls. The results are illustrated in Table 10. The new model specifications 
manage to explain 98.9% of the variance in permanent inequality, 92.9% for transitory inequality 
and 68.9% for wage immobility.  
Including the institutional interaction effects and other controls at the cohort level (shares of 
university  and  upper-  secondary  graduates,  sector  structure,  occupational  structure,  share  of 
unemployed, share of permanent contracts), several changes can be noted. First, for permanent, 
all  six  macroeconomic  shocks  and  their  interactions  with  institutional  factors  become 
insignificant, except for high corporatism. At the same time, the direct effects of institutions and 
most of their cross interactions are highly significant. This suggests that the overall institutional 
structure manages to filter out all direct and indirect effect of these shocks. Hence, in shaping 
permanent inequality patterns, not the individual interactions between shocks and each institution 
count, but how institutions interact with each other in dealing with the effects of these shocks. 
One factor which still appears to interact significantly with aggregate shocks is high corporatism. 
It appears to decrease the impact of aggregate macroeconomic shocks on permanent inequality to 
a larger extent compared with low and intermediate corporatism.  69 
 
All direct effects that were insignificant in the previous specification became significant once we 
controlled for cross-institutional interactions. From those that were significant, EPL, the relative 
difference between EPLR and EPLT, high corporatism and tax wedge changed signs. 
EPL appears to have now a negative direct effect on permanent inequality, which appears to be 
accentuated by the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT, and counteracted by the tax 
wedge.  
Union density appears to have a positive direct effect, which appears to increase with the tax 
wedge and decrease with PMR and  ALPMs. The  interaction with the degree of corporatism 
confirms the hump-shaped pattern hypothesis: for a given level of union density, a high degree of 
corporatism  determines  the  lowest  permanent  inequality,  whereas  intermediate  corporatism 
exacerbates permanent differentials.  
Tax  wedge  has  a  negative  direct  effect  on  permanent  inequality,  which  appears  to  be 
complementary with PMR and the generosity of the unemployment benefit. Factors that appear 
to counteract with its negative effect are EPL, union density and ALMPs.  
PMR has a positive direct effect which appears to be counteracted by union density, tax wedge 
and ALMPs. ALMPs appear to increase permanent inequality, effect which is accentuated by the 
tax wedge, and reduced by PMR. Also union density and unemployment benefit lower the effect 
of ALMP, but the effect is not significant.  
Unemployment benefit has a negative direct effect on permanent inequality, which is reinforced 
by the tax wedge and AMPLs, and counteracted by PMR.  
Similarly with permanent inequality, controlling for the interactions between institutions renders 
the direct and indirect effects of shocks insignificant. This reconfirms that the key role in shaping 70 
 
transitory and permanent inequality patterns is played by the interplay between labour market 
policies and institutions in dealing with macroeconomic shocks.  
The direct effects on transitory inequality modify to larger extent than for permanent inequality 
when these interactions are being introduced. The direct effect of EPL increases considerably 
and remains significant, the relative difference between EPLR and EPLT, and unemployment 
benefit become insignificant, the tax wedge becomes negative and significant, and the degree of 
corporatism becomes negative and significant. PMR is unchanged: negative and significant. 
EPL  increases  transitory  inequality,  but  the  effect  is  counteracted  by  intermediate  and  high 
corporatism, the tax wedge and ALMPs. Other factors appear to counteract as well, but not at a 
significant level.  
Union density does not have a positive direct effect, but most of its indirect effects are highly 
significant. A U-shaped profile appears to characterise the relationship between the degree of 
corporatism  and  transitory  inequality:  the  lowest  transitory  inequality  is  triggered  by  an 
intermediate level, followed by a high level and a low level. The same profile is confirmed also 
for the interaction between union density and the degree of corporatism.  
The  tax  wedge  seems  to  reduce  transitory  inequality.  Its  effect  is  amplified  by  EPL  and 
unemployment benefit replacement rate, and counteracted by union density.  
PMR  has  a  negative  direct  effect,  which  appears  to  be  counteracted only  by  union  density. 
ALMPs have a negative but insignificant direct effect, which is amplified by EPL. Similarly for 
unemployment benefit replacement rate, whose negative effect is amplified by the tax wedge.  
Surprisingly, for wage immobility, the inclusion of the institutional interactions had the opposite 
effect compared with permanent and transitory inequality. The effects of macroeconomic shocks 71 
 
increased  in  absolute  value,  it  kept  the  same  direction  of  influence  and  remained  highly 
significant,  except  for  aggregate  supply  shock,  which  is  insignificant  in  both  model 
specifications. Similarly for the interaction effects between institutions and shocks, except for the 
interaction  between  the  relative  EPLR-EPLT  difference  and  aggregate  shocks  which  is 
insignificant in both specifications.  
Moreover, compared with the previous specification for wage immobility, which had only two 
direct significant institutional factors, in this model all institutional factors are highly significant, 
except for tax wedge and ALMPs. 
EPL appears to have a strong positive effect on wage immobility, which is amplified by union 
density,  the  tax  wedge  and  aggregate  macroeconomic  shocks.  However,  the  effect  of  EPL 
appears to decrease with the degree of corporatism and PMR. An increase in the relative EPLR-
EPLT difference appears to be negatively associated with wage immobility.  
Union density has a negative impact on wage immobility, which is counteracted by EPL, the tax 
wedge and aggregate shocks.  
Intermediate  corporatism  appears  to  trigger  the  lowest  wage  immobility,  followed  by  high 
corporatism and low corporatism. However, the negative impact of high corporatism appears to 
be exacerbated by EPL and aggregate shocks to a larger extent than for intermediate corporatism.  
Tax wedge has a positive, yet insignificant effect, which appears to decrease significantly with 
ALMPs and aggregate shocks.  
PMR lowers wage immobility and this effect seems to be complementary with EPL, with union 
density
xvii and a low degree of corporatism. In interaction with an intermediate corporatism the 
positive impact on wage immobility is stronger than in the interaction with a high corporatism. 72 
 
The positive impact on wage immobility appears to be counteracted by the effects of ALMPs and 
aggregate shocks, as indicated by the positive and significant interaction effects.  
ALMPs has a negative, yet insignificant effect. However, its interaction effects are significant: it 
decreases wage immobility when coupled with the tax wedge and increases wage immobility in 
interaction with PMR and aggregate shocks.  
Unemployment benefit increases wage immobility, effect which is accentuated when coupled 
with a high spending on ALMPs and diminished when coupled with a high PMR. Moreover, in 
interaction with aggregate shocks, it appears to decrease wage immobility. 
8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper explores the role of labour market policy and institutional factors in explaining cross-
national differences in the evolution of permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings 
mobility across 14 EU countries. In Europe, the most notable change after 1995, which is the 
approximate year of the turnaround in the labour market institutional and policy framework, 
represents  the  increased  country  heterogeneity,  which  translated  itself  in  the  level  and  the 
evolution of the cross-sectional earnings inequality components and earnings mobility.  
Increases  in  inequality  appear to reflect  increases  in permanent differentials  in  Luxembourg, 
Italy,  Greece  and  Finland,  and  increases  in  both  components  in  Portugal  and  Netherlands. 
Decreases in inequality appear to result from decreases in transitory differentials in Germany, 
France,  UK  and  Ireland,  in  permanent  differentials  in  Belgium  and  Spain  and  in  both 
components in Denmark and Austria. In most countries, increases in inequality appear to be 
accompanied  by  decreases  in  mobility,  except  for  Netherlands.  Decreases  in  inequality  are 
accompanied by increases in mobility only in Denmark, Belgium and Spain. However, some 73 
 
common  trends  can  be  identified:  the  older  the  cohort, the  higher  the  impact  of  permanent 
variance,  the  lower  the  impact  transitory  inequality  and  the  higher  the  impact  of  wage 
immobility. This reinforces the expectation that earnings volatility is higher at younger ages.  
How can we explain these trends in permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings 
mobility? To answer this question we analysed  the  link with the  labour  market policies and 
institutional factors, accounting also for the impact of macroeconomic shocks.  
Labour market policies and institutions play a highly significant role in shaping the pattern of 
permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings mobility and manage to explain a very 
large share of the variation in these outcomes. However, the estimation results revealed that the 
interplay between these factors is highly complex: institutions interact with each other and also 
with the overall institutional setting. One proof for the degree of complexity is brought by the 
changes in the magnitude and the direction of influence of the direct effects of these institutions 
depending on which interaction effects were introduced in the model. Moreover, labour market 
policies  and  institutions  not  only  affect  these  outcomes  via  their  direct,  cross  and  systemic 
effects, but also via their interactions with macroeconomic shocks.  
The systemic interactions for permanent inequality revealed that the more equality-friendly the 
overall labour market policy and institutional framework is, the greater is the reducing impact on 
permanent differentials of a high union density, an intermediate and high degree of corporatism, 
a  high  tax  wedge  and  a  high  product  market  regulation  (PMR).  For  reducing  transitory 
inequality, a reform complementarity with the overall framework was found for union density 
and the degree of corporatism. Similarly, the more earnings mobility-friendly the overall labour 
market  policy  and  institutional  framework  is,  the  greater  is  the  reducing  impact  on  wage 
immobility of a high union density, and high and intermediate levels of corporatism.  74 
 
Controlling only for the direct effects of institutions and shocks revealed that, the effects of the 
observed macroeconomic shocks on the three labour market outcomes are shaped by the policy 
and institutional framework. The impact is the strongest for permanent inequality, where except 
for terms of trade shock and aggregate demand, the impact of the other shocks is wiped out by 
the direct effects of institutions and their interactions with aggregate shocks. The factor which 
appears to be effective in reducing or limiting the increase of permanent inequality under in the 
impact  of  macroeconomic  shocks  is  the  degree  of  corporatism:  the  higher  the  degree  of 
corporatism, the larger the magnitude of the negative impact in reducing the adverse effect of 
shocks on permanent inequality. Other factors, such as employment protection legislation (EPL), 
the  relative  difference  EPLR-EPLT,  union  density,  the  tax  wedge,  PMR  and  unemployment 
benefits amplify the effects of adverse shocks on permanent differentials.  
For transitory inequality a different mechanism appears to be at work. Factors that diminish the 
adverse effects of shocks are high corporatism, tax wedge and unemployment benefit, whereas 
factors that exacerbate the adverse effect of shocks are PMR and active labour market policies 
(ALMPs).  
For wage immobility the impact of adverse shocks is reduced by intermediate and high levels of 
corporatism, tax wedge and unemployment benefit replacement rate, and enhanced by the other 
factors, except the relative EPLR-EPLT difference, which is insignificant.  
Including the institutional interaction effects, significant changes can be noted. Most importantly, 
for permanent and transitory inequality, the direct effects of shocks and their interactions with 
the institutional factors were wiped out, and the effect appears to have been captured by the 
direct  effects  of  institutions  and  their  cross-interactions.  This  suggests  that  the  overall 
institutional structure manages to filter out all direct and indirect effect of these shocks. Hence, 75 
 
in shaping permanent and transitory inequality patterns, not the individual interactions between 
shocks and each institution count, but how institutions interact with each other in dealing with 
the effects of these shocks. Moreover, more significant direct and indirect effects are noted for 
permanent inequality, reinforcing the expectation that institutional factors play a larger role in 
shaping permanent than transitory inequality.  
For wage immobility the direct effect of shocks and their interactions are still highly significant, 
suggesting  the  importance  of  both  institutions  and  shocks  in  shaping  wage  immobility. 
Moreover, the explained variance of wage immobility is with roughly 20 percentage points lower 
than for the other outcomes, suggesting the presence of other institutional factors that might filter 
the effects of shocks and which have not been included. Factors that reduce the effects of adverse 
shocks on wage immobility are the degree of corporatism, the tax wedge and unemployment 
benefit generosity.  
Controlling for interactions between institutions, and between institutions and shocks, factors 
with  a  positive  direct  effect  on  permanent  differentials  are  union  density,  the  degree  of 
corporatism,  PMR  and  ALMPs.  A  negative  direct  effect  was  found  for  EPL,  the  relative 
difference EPLR-EPLT, tax wedge and unemployment benefit. Transitory inequality is increased 
by EPL, and decreased by intermediate and high corporatism, tax wedge and PMR. Factors with 
positive direct effects on wage immobility are EPL and unemployment benefit replacement rate. 
The others  have  negative effect, except  for tax  wedge and  ALMPs, which are  insignificant. 
However,  the  overall  effect  of  these  factors  on  labour  market  outcomes  is  shaped  by  their 
interactions.  
Permanent inequality appears to be positively influenced by the following interactions: EPL and 
tax  wedge,  union  density  and  tax  wedge,  tax  wedge  and  ALMPs,  PMR  and  unemployment 76 
 
benefit, and negatively by EPL and the relative EPLR-EPLT difference, union density and PMR, 
tax  wedge  and  PMR,  tax  wedge  and  unemployment  benefit,  PMR  and  ALMPs,  PMR  and 
unemployment  benefit.  Moreover,  the  interaction  between  union  density  and  the  degree  of 
corporatism confirms the hump-shaped pattern hypothesis: for a given level of union density, a 
high degree of corporatism determines the lowest permanent inequality, whereas intermediate 
corporatism exacerbates permanent differentials.  
Union  density  coupled  with  tax  wedge,  and  with  PMR  have  a  positive  effect  on  transitory 
differentials, whereas the reverse holds for the tax wedge coupled with EPL, with unemployment 
benefit generosity, and for EPL coupled with ALMPs. The interactions between the degree of 
corporatism  and  union  density  and  EPL  reveal  a  U-shaped  profile:  the  lowest  transitory 
inequality is triggered by an intermediate level, followed by a high level and a low level. 
The interaction effects with a positive impact on wage immobility are: EPL-union density, union 
density tax wedge, PMR-ALMPs, ALMPs-unemployment benefit. Negative effects are found for 
EPL  and  the  degree  of  corporatism,  EPL  and  PMR,  tax  wedge  and  ALMPs,  PMR  and 
unemployment benefit. The interaction between PMR and corporatism reveals a hump-shaped 
profile: for an average PMR, an intermediate corporatism triggers the highest wage immobility, 
followed by high corporatism and low.  
These interactions highlight once more the complex institutional mechanism that is at work in 
shaping the pattern of the three labour market outcomes analysed in this paper. Further work 
could be focused on disentangling amplification from persistence mechanisms. Moreover, the 
link with earnings mobility can be explored further by looking at different mobility measures, 
including long and short period earnings mobility.  
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9.  TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Mean hourly earnings and number of individuals with positive earnings 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany  Mean  9.43  9.49  9.61  9.52  9.57  9.48  9.60  9.72 
 
N  25018  26059  25806  24889  23290  22955  21909  20703 
Denmark  Mean  10.89  11.40  11.58  11.61  11.86  11.85  12.02  12.08 
 
N  20899  20399  19190  19062  17321  16235  15678  15380 
Netherlands  Mean  9.69  9.56  9.59  9.70  10.02  9.88  10.04  9.91 
 
N  33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790  33277 
Belgium  Mean  8.48  8.82  8.71  8.75  8.81  8.83  8.92  9.10 
 
N  20221  22100  22892  22753  22863  23233  24065  24130 
Luxembourg  Mean  16.18  15.81  16.73  17.39  17.15  17.22  17.10 
 
N  15829  13695  14489  13403  14075  12667  12992 
France
xviii  Mean  10.23  9.92  9.87  10.05  10.33  10.60  10.55  10.87 
 
N  20137  19270  19042  17906  14467  14012  13760  14212 
UK  Mean  8.16  8.11  8.22  8.34  8.68  9.01  9.21  9.68 
 
N  24949  25329  25495  26010  26145  25750  25674  25264 
Ireland  Mean  9.30  9.54  9.76  10.02  10.43  10.84  11.69  12.44 
 
N  13937  13221  12590  12515  12435  12091  10745  9727 
Italy  Mean  7.16  6.91  6.96  7.05  7.29  7.37  7.28  7.32 
 
N  32633  32236  32111  29661  28865  26993  26912  25170 
Greece  Mean  4.95  5.03  5.23  5.59  5.63  5.85  5.70  5.77 
 
N  27974  27654  26150  24865  22675  22001  21335  21929 
Spain  Mean  6.83  6.95  7.09  6.89  7.18  7.37  7.45  7.42 
 
N  22559  21863  21296  20975  20371  20580  19898  20185 
Portugal  Mean  9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54  9.08 
 
N  14653  15450  15379  15087  14837  14569  14604  14550 
Austria  Mean    9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54 
 
N    17944  17789  17199  16209  15162  13816  13056 
Finland  Mean      7.89  8.01  8.41  8.45  8.66  8.86 
 
N      15811  15845  15895  15546  13329  13057 
Note: Mean hourly earnings are expressed in Euro. 78 
 
Table 2. Description of OECD variables 
 
 OECD Variables  Description  
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
EPL = Employment 
Protection Legislation 
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation. EPL ranges 
from 0 to 6. 
EPLR = Employment 
Protection Legislation 
for regular contracts 




for temporary contracts 
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation for 
temporary contracts 
Union Density   Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in %. 
Union Coverage  Collective bargaining coverage rate, i.e. the share of workers covered by a collective agreement, 
in %. 
Degree of Corporatism  Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage bargaining processes, which 
takes values 1 for decentralised and uncoordinated processes, and 2 and 3 for intermediate and 
high 
Tax Wedge  The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all social security contributions as 
a percentage of total labour cost. 
PMR  
= Product Market 
Regulation  
OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in seven 
non-manufacturing industries. The data used in this paper cover regulations and market 
conditions in seven energy and service industries. PMR ranges from 0 to 6. 
ALMPs = Public 
expenditures on active 
labour market  
policies 
Public expenditures on active labour market programmes per unemployed worker as a share of  
GDP per capita, in %. 
Average unemployment 
benefit replacement rate 
Average unemployment benefit replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% 
of APW earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) 
Labour Demand Shock   Logarithm of the labour share in business sector GDP purged from the short-run influence of 
factor prices. 
Terms of Trade Shock  Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP 
Total Factor Productivity 
Shock 
Deviation of the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) from its trend calculated by 
means of a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (smoothing parameter λ = 100) 
Real Interest Shock  Difference between the 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and the annual change 
in the GDP deflator (in %). 
Lindert-Allard OECD data sets 1950-2001 
Aggregate Supply Shock  At the OECD level, amplified by openness = (INFLOECD-UNCHOECD)*OPEN/100 , 
INFLOECD = inflation for the OECD as a whole, averaged over the 21 countries, 
UNCHOECD= Three-year change in the unemployment rate for the OECD as a whole) 
OPEN= (exports + imports) as a percentage of GDP, from Penn World Tables 
Aggregate Demand 
Shock 
At the OECD level, amplified by openness= (INFLOECD+UNCHOECD)*OPEN/100 79 
 
Table 3. Institutional Variables - Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
EPL  overall  2.417  0.943  0.6  3.854  N =     104 
between  0.943  0.621  3.739  n =      13 
within  0.247  1.53  3.204  T =       8 
EPLT  overall  2.5  1.446  0.25  5.375  N =     104 
between  1.41  0.25  4.75  n =      13 
within  0.489  0.747  4.031  T =       8 
EPLR  overall  2.33  0.837  0.948  4.333  N =     104 
between  0.858  0.99  4.333  n =      13 
within  0.06  2.166  2.555  T =       8 
[(EPLR-EPLT)/EPLT]*100  overall  0.672  1.659  -0.67  5.413  N =     104 
between  1.704  -0.553  5.413  n =      13 
within  0.214  0.162  1.466  T =       8 
Union Density  overall  37.885  19.602  9.636  79.386  N =     112 
between  20.171  9.788  78.07  n =      14 
within  1.745  31.025  43.705  T =       8 
Degree of Corporatism  overall  2.583  0.644  1  3  N =      96 
between  0.669  1  3  n =      12 
within  0  2.583  2.583  T =       8 
Tax Wedge  overall  32.65  6.886  12.802  44.9  N =      96 
between  6.787  21.935  40.547  n =      12 
within  2.177  23.516  39.123  T =       8 
PMR  overall  3.4  1.003  1.133  5.236  N =      96 
between  0.86  1.454  4.415  n =      12 
within  0.567  2.162  4.465  T =       8 
ALMPs  overall  N =      96 
between  29.778  20.685  4.81  126.1  n =      12 
within  18.843  9.362  74.995  T =       8 
Unemployment Benefit 
Replacement Rate  overall  9.949  -3.8  80.883  N =      96 
between  35.982  11.491  16.589  64.944  n =      12 
within  11.534  17.44  59.87  T=8 
Labour demand shock  overall  0.062  0.062  -0.075  0.167  N =      85 
between  0.063  -0.068  0.147  n =      11 
within  0.013  0.028  0.099  T=7.727 
Terms of Trade Shocks  overall  -0.094  0.040  -0.178  -0.027  N =      93 
between  0.035  -0.146  -0.042  n =      12 
within  0.022  -0.142  -0.041  T=7.75 
Total Factor  Production Shock  overall  0.007  0.016  -0.058  0.047  N =      85 
between  0.007  -0.001  0.019  n =      11 80 
 
within  0.015  -0.056  0.049  T=7.727 
Real Interest Shock  overall  0.039  0.018  -0.016  0.080  N =      93 
between  0.007  0.023  0.045  n =      12 
within  0.017  -0.001  0.088  T=7.75 
Aggregate Labour Supply  overall  1.855  2.084  -0.635  8.145  N =      101 
between  0.924  1.054  3.692  n =      13 
within  1.881  -2.472  6.308  T=7.769 
Aggregate Labour Demand  overall  3.388  1.776  1.175  8.158  N =      101 
between  1.581  2.051  6.578  n =      13 
within  0.871  0.534  4.968  T=7.769 
 
 
Table 4. Share of employees by educational level, by sector, by type of contract, by employment 
status, by occupational - for selected cohorts based on ECHP 
Variable  Cohort 1940-1950  Cohort 1951-1960  Cohort 1961-1970  Cohort 1971-1981 
Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Share of University Degree  108  0.228  0.115  0.248  0.128  0.250  0.130  0.134  0.144 
Share of Upper-Sec Degree  108  0.327  0.191  0.367  0.177  0.401  0.195  0.451  0.197 
Share of permanent contracts  108  0.896  0.074  0.875  0.060  0.849  0.087  0.755  0.170 
Share of private employees  108  0.657  0.096  0.678  0.082  0.789  0.052  0.860  0.055 
Share of Unemployed  108  0.068  0.033  0.057  0.037  0.078  0.043  0.129  0.096 
Occupation Structure (ECHP)  
Share of occupation 1  108  0.118  0.044  0.109  0.045  0.077  0.041  0.021  0.022 
Share of occupation 2  108  0.112  0.049  0.116  0.047  0.103  0.044  0.042  0.032 
Share of occupation 3  108  0.099  0.039  0.118  0.044  0.111  0.045  0.069  0.035 
Share of occupation 4  108  0.057  0.028  0.069  0.040  0.072  0.026  0.056  0.026 
Share of occupation 5  108  0.046  0.021  0.057  0.024  0.065  0.023  0.074  0.029 
Share of occupation 6  108  0.052  0.042  0.042  0.025  0.037  0.025  0.024  0.017 
Share of occupation 7  108  0.160  0.046  0.185  0.054  0.197  0.062  0.165  0.071 
Share of occupation 8  108  0.093  0.029  0.102  0.025  0.101  0.024  0.066  0.021 
Share of occupation 9  108  0.052  0.022  0.062  0.023  0.063  0.026  0.066  0.032 81 
 

































Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate µ σ =
 
7.2609  0.0867  0.0097  0.5891  0.1913  0.0905  0.0698  0.0246  0.1653  0.0293  0.1071  0.0251  0.0467  0.2467 
2 exp( ) estimate ϕ σ =
 
0.0024  0.0968      0.0002  0.0797              0.0001  0.1032 
cov( , ) µ ϕ   -0.1313  0.0121     
-
0.0052 




2 exp( ) estimate π σ =       0.0014  0.1494                     
Time shifters,  1,1994 1 λ =                            
1,1995 λ
  1.0734  0.0084  1.0185  0.0210  0.9735  0.0158  0.9421  0.0116  1.0511  0.0129  1    0.9915  0.0082 
1,1996 λ
  1.1503  0.0112  0.9910  0.0209  0.9748  0.0172  1.0041  0.0122  1.1058  0.0130  1.0215  0.0220  0.9070  0.0103 
1,1997 λ
  1.2028  0.0142  0.9011  0.0231  0.9334  0.0159  0.9225  0.0145  1.1338  0.0144  1.1810  0.0208  0.9228  0.0126 
1,1998 λ
  1.2720  0.0215  0.9022  0.0256  0.9876  0.0169  0.8915  0.0160  1.1295  0.0173  1.2493  0.0222  0.8936  0.0146 
1,1999 λ
  1.4078  0.0188  0.7953  0.0257  0.8963  0.0184  0.7853  0.0162  1.1257  0.0181  1.3205  0.0248  0.8571  0.0154 
1,2000 λ
  1.5155  0.0222  0.7431  0.0287  0.8749  0.0193  0.9245  0.0170  1.0581  0.0188  1.3425  0.0314  0.7802  0.0163 
1,2001 λ
  1.4744  0.0280  0.7643  0.0264  0.9096  0.0208  0.9207  0.0156  1.0842  0.0186  1.2977  0.0222  0.7982  0.0175 
Cohort shifters,  1,40 50 1 γ − =                            
1,51 60 γ −   0.4401  0.0145  1.0630  0.0306  1.2748  0.0424  1.0127  0.0138  0.8589  0.0139  0.9557  0.0189  1.4131  0.0301 
1,61 70 γ −   0.2031  0.0088  1.0950  0.0704  1.3168  0.1144  0.7776  0.0105  0.7796  0.0131  0.9396  0.0183  2.0459  0.0992 
1,71 80 γ −   0.0856  0.0046  0.9890  0.1467  0.7891  0.0704  0.1425  0.0387  0.5000  0.0178  0.5933  0.0183  2.4514  0.2435 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate ε σ =   0.2578  0.5741  0.1315  0.2626  0.1262  0.3096  0.2439  0.1523  0.7969  0.5779  0.0186  0.1671  0.0702  0.1110 82 
 
2
0 exp( ) estimate σ =                              
2
0,40 50 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0044  0.7316  0.0368  0.0732  0.0228  0.0913  0.0639  0.0437  0.1039  0.0491  0.0753  0.0638  0.0764  0.0437 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0562  0.0887  0.0255  0.0810  0.0271  0.1208  0.0357  0.0663  0.0913  0.0902  0.1064  0.1109  0.0789  0.0605 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0419  0.0940  0.0349  0.0725  0.0112  0.2073  0.0392  0.0535  0.0486  0.0843  0.0672  0.1136  0.0750  0.0681 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0832  0.0679  0.0284  0.0705  0.0406  0.0962  0.0347  0.0596  0.0956  0.0966  0.0225  0.1220  0.0313  0.1179 
ρ   0.3583  0.0223  0.5472  0.0732  0.3289  0.0118  0.6280  0.0104  0.3993  0.0254  0.2389  0.0161  0.4512  0.0125 
θ                              
Time shifters,  2,1994 1 λ =                            
2,1995 λ
  0.4531  0.1298  0.3697  0.0502  0.4936  0.0756  0.2941  0.0226  0.2517  0.0739  1    0.8214  0.0418 
2,1996 λ
  0.3801  0.1088  0.3548  0.0508  0.4839  0.0771  0.2396  0.0181  0.1703  0.0504  1.9774  0.1487  0.8135  0.0475 
2,1997 λ
  0.3480  0.1008  0.3531  0.0483  0.4839  0.0756  0.2677  0.0202  0.1963  0.0572  1.4402  0.1377  0.7179  0.0406 
2,1998 λ
  0.3511  0.1013  0.3077  0.0409  0.3287  0.0505  0.2784  0.0209  0.2373  0.0676  1.0818  0.0915  0.7025  0.0359 
2,1999 λ
  0.3886  0.1121  0.4086  0.0543  0.3875  0.0605  0.3371  0.0255  0.2284  0.0650  1.2422  0.1019  0.7140  0.0377 
2,2000 λ
  0.2918  0.0841  0.3980  0.0538  0.4541  0.0710  0.2704  0.0201  0.2432  0.0696  1.3644  0.1127  0.8482  0.0482 
2,2001 λ
  0.3957  0.1147  0.3595  0.0484  0.5629  0.0877  0.3255  0.0257  0.2346  0.0675  1.4003  0.1195  0.7977  0.0453 
Cohort shifters,  2,40 50 1 γ − =                            
2,51 60 γ −   0.9547  0.0299  1.1521  0.0265  1.0459  0.0294  1.0555  0.0189  0.9383  0.0293  0.8573  0.0355  0.8949  0.0171 
2,61 70 γ −   0.9643  0.0268  1.2128  0.0205  1.1180  0.0313  0.9996  0.0140  1.0469  0.0303  1.0445  0.0429  0.9938  0.0182 
2,71 80 γ −   1.3832  0.0411  1.8237  0.0325  1.7278  0.0464  1.3569  0.0233  1.5123  0.0465  1.4318  0.0595  1.1898  0.0224 
SSR  0.0143  0.0068  0.0099  0.0047  0.0240  0.0222  0.0061 
2 χ   2473.7073  5872.5492  2492.7787  17769.4220  1756.3574  1632.2320  2597.3157 
LogL  459.2576  512.8864  486.0084  540.0406  421.9693  318.4753  520.5053 
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Param.  SE  Param.  Param.  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE 
Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate µ σ =
 
0.0564  0.3502  0.0325  0.0325  0.0779  0.0915  0.294  0.059  0.2561  0.0303  0.0811  0.0449  0.0616  0.2703 
2 exp( ) estimate ϕ σ =
 
0.0002  0.1435  0.00008  0.00008  0.0002  0.0582  0.000  0.000          0.0001  0.1399 
cov( , ) µ ϕ   -0.0029  0.0007  -0.0014  -0.0014 
-
0.0034 




Time shifters,  1,1994 1 λ =                              
1,1995 λ
  0.9784  0.0114  0.9529  0.0112  1.0205  0.0145  1.010  0.012  0.9767  0.0119  1       
1,1996 λ
  0.9230  0.0126  0.9548  0.0184  0.9970  0.0194  0.973  0.017  1.0414  0.0124  1.0112  0.0244  1   
1,1997 λ
  0.9602  0.0167  0.9085  0.0212  1.0386  0.0229  0.972  0.022  1.0176  0.0140  1.0570  0.0287  1.1265  0.0193 
1,1998 λ
  0.9141  0.0185  0.9868  0.0267  1.0104  0.0239  0.976  0.027  1.0187  0.0157  0.9843  0.0291  1.0778  0.0232 
1,1999 λ
  0.8559  0.0193  0.9983  0.0292  1.0606  0.0238  0.959  0.032  0.9875  0.0171  0.9081  0.0379  1.0173  0.0274 
1,2000 λ
  0.7928  0.0215  0.9704  0.0307  0.9236  0.0227  0.898  0.036  1.0925  0.0194  0.9403  0.0391  0.9554  0.0266 
1,2001 λ
  0.7770  0.0249  0.9476  0.0335  0.9267  0.0207  0.867  0.040  1.0758  0.0199  0.9425  0.0384  1.0297  0.0309 
Cohort shifters,  1,40 50 1 γ − =                              
1,51 60 γ −   1.3594  0.0443  1.2272  0.0463  1.3261  0.0233  1.162  0.074  0.9340  0.0178  0.8921  0.0198  1.3819  0.0485 
1,61 70 γ −   2.0128  0.1621  1.3857  0.1189  1.9371  0.0811  0.988  0.120  0.7691  0.0162  0.8354  0.0262  2.4403  0.1705 
1,71 80 γ −   2.9811  0.4996  1.5606  0.2008  3.9268  0.4940  0.475  0.078  0.3140  0.0203  0.4591  0.0293  2.9792  0.7975 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) parameter ε σ =   0.0285  0.1649  0.0582  0.0758  0.1183  0.0750  0.099  0.006  0.2584  0.2067  0.4830  0.1811  0.0555  0.2197 84 
 
2
0 exp( ) estimate σ =               0.052  0.004  0.0428  0.0974  0.0751  0.0652     
2
0,40 50 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0709  0.0825  0.0314  0.0898  0.0791  0.0516              0.0550  0.0743 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0688  0.0966  0.0422  0.0619  0.0574  0.0702              0.0588  0.0701 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0942  0.0869  0.0521  0.0592  0.1011  0.0436              0.0707  0.0727 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate σ − =   0.0801  0.1015  0.0283  0.0919  0.0695  0.1269              0.0464  0.1098 
ρ   0.2912  0.0229  0.6438  0.0428  0.5995  0.0346  0.849  0.024  0.7785  0.0149  0.7009  0.0292  0.2904  0.0195 
θ       -0.2506  0.0204 
-
0.1487 
0.0242  -0.364  0.007             
Time loading factors, 
2,1994 1 λ =
 
                           
2,1995 λ
  1.2269  0.0938  0.7692  0.0239  0.7991  0.0261  0.907  0.027  0.5061  0.0525  1       
2,1996 λ
  1.2789  0.1050  0.8238  0.0294  0.6992  0.0277  0.815  0.024  0.3117  0.0367  0.2929  0.0291  1   
2,1997 λ
  1.0434  0.0818  0.7296  0.0241  0.6171  0.0280  0.842  0.024  0.3536  0.0383  0.2089  0.0224  0.8849  0.0977 
2,1998 λ
  1.0924  0.0853  0.7536  0.0264  0.6269  0.0275  0.887  0.023  0.3723  0.0397  0.1724  0.0196  0.7069  0.0809 
2,1999 λ
  1.0595  0.0821  0.6516  0.0242  0.6106  0.0256  0.760  0.021  0.3555  0.0371  0.2270  0.0223  0.9301  0.0957 
2,2000 λ
  1.0816  0.0876  0.6656  0.0225  0.7195  0.0287  0.821  0.022  0.3484  0.0362  0.2203  0.0220  0.8191  0.0861 
2,2001 λ
  1.1093  0.0968  0.6998  0.0234  0.6657  0.0287  0.856  0.023  0.3921  0.0400  0.2248  0.0229  0.7937  0.0852 
Cohort specific factors, 
2,40 50 1 γ − =                              
2,51 60 γ −   0.9889  0.0352  0.9894  0.0204  0.9608  0.0179  1.004  0.025  0.7800  0.0383  0.8410  0.0254  0.8609  0.0253 
2,61 70 γ −   1.0987  0.0403  1.0324  0.0217  1.0187  0.0183  1.051  0.025  1.0102  0.0399  0.8986  0.0280  0.8714  0.0252 
2,71 80 γ −   1.1532  0.0458  1.3299  0.0278  0.9443  0.0256  1.330  0.030  1.1072  0.0409  1.1979  0.0416  1.2070  0.0349 
SSR  0.0273  0.0017  0.0146  0.0094  0.0288  0.0052  0.0038 
2 χ   2116.2117  1576.2281  3824.4496  1984.9587  3737.5070  2229.2852  945.1045 
LogL  412.7881  611.7874  458.0054  489.8478  408.9498  399.6179  300.6177 85 
 









Finland (except the youngest cohort) 
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Germany (except for the cohorts born in 1941-
1950 and 1961-1970), 
Denmark, 
Belgium (except for the youngest cohort), 
France (except for the cohort born in 1961-1970), 
UK(except for the youngest two cohorts), 
Ireland , 
Spain  (except the youngest cohort), 
Austria 
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Table 7. Pair wise Correlations Between the Labour Market Outcomes, Labour Market Institutional 
Factors and Macroeconomic Shocks 
Pair wise Correlations 

















0.314  -0.238  0.200  0.164  0.144  -0.310 
0.000  0.017  0.001  0.102  0.012  0.002 
EPL regular contracts (EPLR) 
0.489  -0.162  0.181  0.255  0.230  -0.255 
0.000  0.106  0.002  0.010  0.000  0.010 
EPL temporary contracts (EPLT) 
0.123  -0.209  0.155  0.069  0.053  -0.250 
0.033  0.036  0.007  0.495  0.361  0.012 
[(EPLR-EPLT)/EPLT]*100 
0.117  0.555  0.082  -0.149  0.027  0.593 
0.041  0.000  0.155  0.136  0.647  0.000 
Union Density 
-0.591  -0.345  -0.306  -0.332  -0.254  -0.123 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.207 
Degree of Corporatism 
-0.498  -0.443  -0.472  -0.225  -0.090  -0.204 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.030  0.136  0.049 
Tax Wedge 
-0.298  -0.380  -0.250  0.095  -0.065  -0.444 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.367  0.283  0.000 
PMR 
0.246  0.038  0.052  0.048  0.160  0.016 
0.000  0.719  0.385  0.651  0.008  0.880 
Active Labour Market Policies 
-0.269  -0.223  -0.230  0.153  -0.068  -0.189 
0.000  0.032  0.000  0.142  0.259  0.070 
Average Unemployment  
Benefit Replacement Rate 
-0.228  -0.466  -0.202  0.225  -0.125  -0.480 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.030  0.037  0.000 
Labour Demand Shock 
0.174  0.597  0.027  0.006  0.064  0.569 
0.005  0.000  0.671  0.957  0.308  0.000 
Terms of Trade Shock 
-0.028  0.149  -0.065  -0.067  0.106  0.102 
0.637  0.153  0.277  0.522  0.077  0.332 
Total Factor Production Shock 
-0.244  -0.092  -0.360  -0.253  -0.046  0.154 
0.000  0.402  0.000  0.020  0.464  0.161 
Real Interest Shock 
-0.150  -0.143  -0.003  -0.006  -0.046  -0.225 
0.012  0.173  0.961  0.959  0.464  0.030 
Aggregate Supply Shock 
-0.105  -0.081  -0.004  -0.004  -0.017  -0.108 
0.069  0.419  0.948  0.967  0.774  0.284 
Aggregate Demand Shock 
-0.206  -0.152  -0.242  -0.237  -0.090  -0.001 
0.000  0.130  0.000  0.017  0.117  0.990 
Note: P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 8. Systemic Effects across Institutions 
 















   
EPL  0.194***  0.059  0.025  0.018  0.116  0.075 
Relative EPL  0.095***  0.024  0.008  0.008  -0.004  0.037 
Union Density  -1.197***  0.345  -0.023  0.037  -1.586***  0.556 
Int. Corp.  -0.897***  0.053  -0.551***  0.105  -1.173***  0.115 
High Corp.  -0.559***  0.111  -0.898***  0.064  -0.818***  0.073 
Tax Wedge  -1.514***  0.594  0.072  0.071  -0.736  0.745 
PMR  -0.065***  0.023  0.003  0.008  0.184**  0.072 
ALMPs  0.057  0.090  0.016  0.032  1.848***  0.618 
Unemployment Benefit  1.069***  0.324  0.184***  0.104  0.779*  0.444 
Direct Effects 
   
 
 
   
EPL  0.079***  0.021  0.052  0.067  14.902***  5.565 
Relative EPL  0.053***  0.008  0.019  0.019  3.288*  1.827 
Union Density  -0.342***  0.102  -0.370  0.246  -18.40**  8.767 
Intermediate Corporatism  0.309***  0.080  -0.183  0.402  -6.520*  3.380 
High Corporatism  0.092***  0.026  -1.049  0.890  13.149***  4.612 
Tax Wedge  0.722***  0.118  0.236  0.155  30.106  18.698 
PMR  0.008  0.013  -0.086***  0.025  1.721  1.506 
ALMPs  0.014  0.037  0.341**  0.175  12.104**  5.658 
Unemployment Benefit  -0.843***  0.250  0.801**  0.383  -130.994***  45.505 
Cohort 1940-1950  1  1 
 
1   
Cohort 1951-1960  0.885***  0.015  0.886***  0.046  0.650***  0.048 
Cohort 1961-1970  0.621***  0.014  1.046***  0.050  0.385***  0.043 
Cohort 1971-1980  0.205***  0.012  1.807***  0.071  0.082**  0.041 
1994  1  1 
 
1   
1995  0.961***  0.032  0.726***  0.040  0.345***  0.055 
1996  0.979***  0.033  0.562***  0.036  0.546***  0.064 
1997  1.023***  0.035  0.503***  0.035  0.702***  0.086 
1998  0.984***  0.036  0.462***  0.035  0.679***  0.087 
1999  0.921***  0.040  0.434***  0.038  0.682***  0.106 
2000  0.899***  0.044  0.404***  0.037  0.790***  0.131 
2001  0.880***  0.046  0.422***  0.039  0.529***  0.103 
Adj. R-squared  0.978  0.937  0.737 
N  372  372  372 
Note: Estimated with non-linear least squares 
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Table 9. Specific interactions between institutions and shocks 
 
Permanent Variance  Temporary Variance  Wage Immobility 
Direct effects of institutions   Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE 
EPL  0.027***  0.006  0.012***  0.004  0.416  0.877 
Relative EPL  0.027***  0.002  0.012***  0.001  0.915***  0.224 
Union Density  -0.013  0.014  0.001  0.009  -4.158  2.662 
Int. Corp.  0.080***  0.011  0.036***  0.007  0.191  2.081 
High Corp.  -0.043***  0.011  0.015**  0.007  1.297  1.966 
Tax Wedge  0.125***  0.039  0.012  0.026  -0.024  7.036 
PMR  -0.002  0.004  -0.011***  0.003  0.082  0.436 
ALMPs  0.061**  0.032  -0.024  0.016  -2.970  2.285 
Unemployment Benefit  -0.007  0.037  0.071***  0.022  9.214**  4.271 
Direct effects of shocks       
Aggregate Supply Shock  -0.001  0.002  0.006***  0.002  -0.221  0.423 
Aggregate Demand Shock  0.007**  0.003  -0.009***  0.003  -1.550**  0.625 
Labour Demand Shock  0.005  0.082  -0.139**  0.061  -143.497***  41.320 
Terms of Trade Shock  -1.092***  0.292  0.412***  0.156  206.340***  53.541 
Total Factor Production Shock  0.178  0.255  0.227**  0.092  176.586**  74.340 
Interest Rate Shock  -0.119  0.255  -0.475***  0.178  -353.420***  100.985 
Interaction Effects 
   
 
 
   
EPL  0.464***  0.112  -0.112  0.271  0.582***  0.111 
Relative EPL  0.323***  0.085  -0.128  0.122  -0.002  0.061 
Union Density  1.994***  0.509  -0.381  0.555  1.057***  0.275 
Intermediate Corporatism  -0.421**  0.180  -0.023  0.345  -1.067***  0.156 
High Corporatism  -1.608***  0.170  -0.661***  0.129  -0.631***  0.114 
Tax Wedge  3.332**  1.514  -3.296*  1.755  -4.582**  1.801 
PMR  0.207***  0.077  0.578***  0.192  0.163**  0.064 
ALMPs  -0.099  0.326  1.317**  0.612  0.999**  0.433 
Unemployment Benefit  1.681**  0.671  -1.932*  1.152  -1.374*  0.771 
       
Cohort 1940-1950  1  1 
 
1   
Cohort 1951-1960  0.882***  0.016  0.937***  0.054  0.589***  0.052 
Cohort 1961-1970  0.618***  0.014  1.044***  0.057  0.374***  0.048 
Cohort 1971-1980  0.242***  0.012  1.918***  0.086  0.081*  0.045 
Adjuster R-squared  0.979  0.929  0.689 
N  320  320  320 




Table  10.  Model  with  cross-interactions  between  institutions  and  between  institutions  and 
macroeconomic shocks 
 
Permanent Variance  Temporary Variance  Wage Immobility 
Direct effects of institutions   Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE 
EPL  -0.111***  0.013  0.187**  0.080  92.018***  22.647 
Relative EPL  -0.076***  0.011  0.007  0.005  -5.944***  1.405 
Union Density  0.668***  0.133  0.230  0.264  -15.128***  4.906 
Int. Corp.  0.761***  0.107  -0.405**  0.167  -180.138***  40.660 
High Corp.  0.160***  0.051  -0.300*  0.155  -168.618***  39.571 
Tax Wedge  -0.286***  0.088  -0.264***  0.059  50.973  51.564 
PMR  0.022***  0.004  -0.010***  0.003  -19.803***  7.190 
ALMPs  0.117***  0.035  -0.005  0.016  -5.975  7.591 
Unemployment Benefit  -0.211***  0.041  -0.261  0.367  21.271**  9.375 
Interactions between Institutions 
   
 
 
   
EPL*Relative EPL  -0.040***  0.007  -0.003  0.004     
EPL*Union Density 
   
-0.057  0.041  80.163***  12.886 
EPL*Intermediate Corporatism 
   
-0.244***  0.081  -69.460***  21.389 
EPL*High Corporatism 
   
-0.156**  0.081  -105.232***  23.669 
EPL*Tax Wedge  0.363***  0.094  -0.287***  0.085  24.919  21.641 
EPL*PMR 
   
0.001  0.008  -8.406***  1.725 
EPL*ALMPs 
   
-0.054**  0.026  -8.390  10.214 
EPL* Unemployment Benefit 
   
0.012  0.047  4.195  14.413 
Union Density* Intermediate Corporatism  1.330***  0.370  -0.896**  0.355     
Union Density *High Corporatism  -0.950***  0.145  -0.212  0.267     
Union Density *Tax Wedge  2.322***  0.500  0.634**  0.335  263.715***  90.336 
Union Density *PMR  -0.055**  0.023  0.058***  0.019  -4.699  4.773 
Union Density *ALMPs  -0.150  0.144   
 
   
Union Density * Unemployment Benefit 
   
 
 
   
Tax Wedge * Intermediate Corporatism 
   
 
 
42.410  58.534 
Tax Wedge *High Corporatism 
   
 
 
-91.419  58.678 
Tax Wedge *PMR  -0.185***  0.061   
 
   
Tax Wedge *ALMPs  1.552**  0.784   
 
-376.100***  129.645 
Tax Wedge * Unemployment Benefit  -4.255***  0.987  -1.047**  0.475     
PMR * Intermediate Corporatism 
   
 
 
23.631***  7.450 
PMR *High Corporatism 
   
 
 
16.566**  6.963 
PMR *ALMPs  -0.086***  0.022   
 
15.750***  5.145 
PMR * Unemployment Benefit  0.323***  0.047   
 
-35.136**  8.210 
ALMPs * Intermediate Corporatism 
   
 
 
   
ALMPs *High Corporatism 
   
 
 
   
ALMPs * Unemployment Benefit  -0.427  0.309   
 
291.018***  62.972 
Unemployment Benefit *Intermediate Corporatism 
   
0.462  0.390     90 
 
Unemployment Benefit *High Corporatism 
   
0.275  0.372     
Direct effects of shocks  Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE  Estimate  SE 
Aggregate Supply Shock 
   
0.0003  0.005  1.091  0.905 
Aggregate Demand Shock 
   
-0.0003  0.004  -8.943***  1.485 
Labour Demand Shock  0.240  0.232  0.0059  0.079  -387.124***  60.752 
Terms of Trade Shock  -0.158  0.154  -0.0005  0.008  723.155***  118.535 
Total Factor Production Shock  -0.032  0.048  0.0077  0.104  141.921**  80.707 
Interest Rate Shock  -0.023  0.042  -0.0059  0.080  -1039.221*** 147.930 
Interactions between institutions  
and shocks     
 
 
   
EPL  -0.378  0.556  11.852  160.175  0.475***  0.080 
Relative EPL 
   
0.760  10.467  -0.032  0.037 
Union Density  5.980  6.174  -67.706  918.096  1.155***  0.160 
Intermediate Corporatism  8.230  9.478  67.658  929.291  -0.728***  0.066 
High Corporatism  -2.026*  1.135  22.614  320.174  -0.863***  0.030 
Tax Wedge  3.272  4.665  -185.221  2511.978 -3.678***  0.684 
PMR  -0.067  0.276  -0.557  8.052  0.097***  0.029 
ALMPs  -3.541  5.178  -2.107  38.717  2.148***  0.295 
Unemployment Benefit  8.568  8.235  -32.498  446.731  -2.040***  0.330 
Controls – cohort level 
   
 
 
   
Proportion of university degree 
   
 
 
0.122  0.789 
Proportion of upper-secondary degree 
   
 
 
0.226  0.566 
Proportion of private employees  -0.019***  0.007  0.015  0.012  -1.642**  0.694 
Proportion of permanent contracts  0.034***  0.007  0.003  0.009  0.916  0.704 
Proportion  of unemployed 
   
 
 
   
Occ 1  0.135***  0.038   
 
8.231***  2.466 
Occ 2  0.051*  0.028   
 
   
Occ 3  -0.056*  0.029   
 
   
Occ 4 
   
 
 
   
Occ 5  0.132***  0.034   
 
   
Occ 6 
   
 
 
8.560  5.797 
Occ 7  -0.060***  0.016  0.021  0.025     
Occ 8 
   
-0.038  0.039  8.736**  4.154 
Occ 9 
   
0.062  0.044  4.553  3.465 
Cohort Shifters 
   
 
 
   




1   
Cohort 1951-1960  0.869***  0.016  0.857***  0.081  0.163***  0.043 
Cohort 1961-1970  0.601***  0.017  0.951***  0.103  0.090*  0.043 
Cohort 1971-1980  0.222***  0.022  2.325***  0.260  0.018  0.045 
Adjuster R-squared  0.989  0.929  0.689 
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Figure 5. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory 
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Figure 5. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory Predicted 
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Figure 7. Earnings Immobility - Ratio between Average Permanent Variance and Average 
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2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), ( , ) it i i it i i i i age iid iid E µ ϕ µϕ µ µ ϕ µ σ ϕ σ µ ϕ σ = + = ∼ ∼ .  The  variances 
2
µ σ   and
2
ϕ σ   capture  individual  heterogeneity  with  respect  to  time-invariant  characteristics  and  age-
earnings profiles. A positive covariance between  i µ  and  i ϕ  implies a rising inequality in the 
permanent  component  of  earnings  over  the  life  cycle,  which  is  consistent  with  the  school-
matching models. A negative covariance implies that the two sources of heterogeneity offset 
each other, which is consistent with the on-the-job training. A negative covariance is expected to 




, 1 , 1 , (0, ), ( , ) 0 ia i a ia ia i a ia u u iid E u π π π σ π − − = + = ∼   The  current  value  depends  on  the  one 
from the previous age and an  innovation term  ia π , which accommodates any permanent re-
ranking of individuals in the earnings distribution. The high persistency of the unit root model 
might  result  from  low  rates  of  depreciation  on  human  capital  investments  or  labour  market 





, (0, ), (0, )
p q
j it j j it j it i c
j j
v iid v ε ρ θ ε ε σ σ − −
= =
= ∑ ∑ ∼ ∼  
iv  The  European  Community  Household  Panel  provided  by  Eurostat  via  the  Department  of 
Applied Economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
v The multiplicative constant equals e.g. p*(Population above 16/Sample Population). The ratio p 
varies across countries so that sensible samples are obtained. It ranges between 0.001-0.01. 
viThe data was provided by email from the authors.  
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vii http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/OECD%20data.htm 
viii  c Tand  0c t represent the total number of years and the first year observed for each cohort. 
ix See Macurdy(1982, page 92/93) 
x1994 refers to t=0 
xi Exception are countries which are not observed for all eight waves, and consequently will have 
less observations.  
xii i.e. 144 auto-covariances for countries observed over 8 waves, 122 for those with 7 waves and 
84 for those with 6 waves. 
xiii 
2 4.89 100 ϕ σ = ⋅  
xiv For the other countries, the MA component was either rejected by the data or could not be 
identified due to the low number of waves.  
xv Average permanent variance and transitory variance represent average across cohorts. 
xvi  Average  immobility  was  computed  as  a  ratio  between  average  permanent  variance  and 
average transitory variance 
xvii Not significant 
xviii Gross Amounts 
                                                                                                                                                                                   